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FASCISM AND MONOPOLY
Daniel A. Crane†

The recent revival of political interest in antitrust has resurfaced a
longstanding debate about the role of industrial concentration and monopoly
in enabling Hitler’s rise to power and the Third Reich’s wars of aggression.
Proponents of stronger antitrust enforcement argue that monopolies and
cartels brought the Nazis to power and warn that rising concentration in the
American economy could similarly threaten democracy. Skeptics demur,
observing that German big business largely opposed Hitler during the crucial
years of his ascent. Drawing on business histories and archival material from
the U.S. Office of Military Government’s Decartelization Unit, this Article
assesses the historical record on the role of industrial concentration in
facilitating Nazism. It finds compelling evidence that, while German big
business principally did not support Hitler before he won the Chancellorship in
1933, the extreme concentration of market power during the Weimar period
enabled Hitler to seize and consolidate totalitarian power through a variety of
mechanisms. Hence, the German experience with Nazism lends support to the
idea that extreme concentration of economic power enables extreme
concentration of political power. However, most of the conduct that created the
radical economic concentration of the Weimar period would be unlawful under
contemporary antitrust principles, which casts doubt on claims that a
significant shift in antitrust enforcement is necessary to forestall antidemocratic forces.
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“The Decartelization Branch … should make every effort to teach the German people
that political democracy cannot long survive the disappearance of economic democracy …”
U.S. Office of Military Government Decartelization Branch, March 28, 1946
In the wake of the Second World War, the United States Congress enacted reform antitrust
legislation to halt the “rising tide of economic concentration” in the American economy. 1 The
framers of the 1950 Celler-Kefauver Act advanced a stark claim about dangers of undue
concentrations of economic power: industrial “monopolies brought Hitler to power,” 2 and the
same could happen in the United States. Senators Celler and Kefauver’s claim arose from
extensive reports by the U.S. Army’s Decartelization division (operating in Germany from
1945-1949) which concluded that German industrial monopolies and cartels in key fields such
as chemicals, armaments, steel, and electricity had played a key role in Hitler’s rise to power
and the atrocities of the Nazi regime. 3
After a period of intensive antitrust enforcement against mergers and monopolies in the
1950s, 60s, and early 70s, the anti-totalitarian rationale for antitrust enforcement was lost in the
tectonic shift in antitrust policy begun by the Chicago School. 4 Despite occasional reminders
that antitrust has a “political content,” 5 antitrust law became concerned near-exclusively with
the promotion of consumer welfare. Debate over antitrust law and policy continued, but it was
largely closeted within an establishment clique of lawyers and economists operating within the
antitrust profession.
The insulated, technocratic decades of antitrust may be coming to a close. In the last several
years, antitrust law has achieved a political saliency that it has not experienced since its
formative years around the turn of the twentieth century. From right to left, the top tiers of the
political class have returned to antitrust as a popular political issue, a potential holding place
for a wide variety of problems and anxieties, from wealth inequality to Big Tech’s power over
data and privacy. 6
There are growing signs that, in the nascent challenge to the reigning consumer welfare
regime, concerns over monopoly’s effects on liberal democracy may come again to the fore, as
they did at the end of the Second World War. Voices on the Democrats’ progressive wing like
Senator Elizabeth Warren have been warning that “[c]oncentration threatens our markets,
threatens our economy, and threatens our democracy.” 7 The influential Open Markets Institute
argues that the Progressive obsession with the Supreme Court’s Citizen United 8 decision
ignores the equally anti-democratic effects of corporate consolidation brought about by lax

Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 315-16 (1962).
95 Cong. Rec. 11, 486 (1949).
3
See infra text accompanying notes xxx – xxx.
4
See Daniel A. Crane, Chicago, Post-Chicago, and Neo-Chicago, 76 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1911 (2009).
5
Robert Pitofsky, The Political Content of Antitrust, 127 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1051, 1051 (1979).
6
See Daniel A. Crane, Antitrust’s Unconventional Politics, 104 Va. L. Rev. Online 118 (2018).
7
Senator Elizabeth Warren Delivers Remarks on Reigniting Competition in the American Economy, June
29, 2016, https://www.warren.senate.gov/?p=press_release&id=1169; see also Brian Beutler, How
Democrats Can Wage War on Monopolies—and Win, New Republic, Sept. 16, 2017,
https://newrepublic.com/article/144675/democrats-elizabeth-warren-can-wage-war-monopolies-and-win.
8
Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
1
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antitrust. 9 The critique has migrated to the political center, with the Congressional Democrats
asserting that “concentrated economic power leads to concentrated political power.” 10 Centrists
policy groups like the Brookings Institution argue that stronger antitrust is necessary to prevent
big tech firms from “wield[ing] excessive influence in our democracy.” 11
These critiques are not limited to the political left or center. On the right, President Trump
warns that allowing deals like AT&T/Time Warner “destroy[s] democracy.” 12 Even staunch
defenders of the consumer welfare standard, like Republican Senator Orrin Hatch, have recently
trumpeted the importance of antitrust as a political institution—“the magna carta of the free
enterprise system” and “the capitalist’s answer to the siren song of the central planner.” 13 Along
the broad political continuum, there appears to be a consensus forming—at least a rhetorical
one—that antitrust is an important institution of democracy, not merely a tool for extracting
lower prices for consumers. At this potentially generative moment in antitrust history,
antitrust’s relationship to democracy is back on the table for reexamination.
As the relationship between monopoly and democracy seeps back into popular discourse,
attention is naturally reoriented to the post-War moment when that relationship was last
squarely on the table. Across a variety of political, popular, and scholarly platforms, a debate
about the role of industrial monopolies and cartels in enabling Hitler’s rise to power and wars
of aggression has ignited. 14 The political stakes in characterizing German heavy industry’s

Democracy & Monopoly, https://openmarketsinstitute.org/explainer/democracy-and-monopoly/.
U.S. House of Representatives Democratic Leadership, A Better Deal: Crack Down on Corporate
Monopolies & the Abuse of Economic and Political Power, https://abetterdeal.democraticleader.gov/crackdown-on-abuse-of-power/
11
Clara Hendrickson & William A. Galston, Big Technology firms challenge traditional assumptions
about antitrust enforcement, Brookings Institution, December 6, 2017,
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/techtank/2017/12/06/big-technology-firms-challenge-traditionalassumptions-about-antitrust-enforcement/.
12
Trump’s comments create a lose-lose position for Justice, Washington Post (Nov. 13, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/trumps-comments-create-a-lose-lose-position-forjustice/2017/11/13/6fd7b28e-c596-11e7-aae0-cb18a8c29c65_story.html?utm_term=.3fa9eb549b54.
13
Hatch Speaks on Growing Controversy Over Antitrust Law in the Tech Sector, Aug. 3, 2017,
https://www.hatch.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/releases?ID=299BA71A-9DAB-45AC-BC7C0FABB967451C.
14
See, e.g., Tim Wu, The Curse of Bigness: Antitrust in the New Gilded Age 80 (2018) (arguing that
industrial concentration facilitated Hitler’s rise to power); Tim Wu, Be Afraid of Economic ‘Bigness.’ Be
Very Afraid. https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/10/opinion/sunday/fascism-economy-monopoly.html (arguing
that in the 1930s monopolies contributed to the rise of fascism); JONATHAN TEPPER, THE MYTH OF
CAPITALISM: MONOPOLIES AND THE DEATH OF COMPETITION 137-153 (2019) (“It is difficult to understate
the importance of concentrated industry to the Nazi rise.”); Alex Stapp, In “The Curse of Bigness” Tim Wu
makes his case that Big Business ushered in the Nazis, Salon https://www.salon.com/2019/03/14/in-thecurse-of-bigness-tim-wu-makes-his-case-that-big-business-ushered-in-the-nazis/ (voicing skepticism that
historical record support claims that big business ushered in Hitler); Matt Stoller, How Democrats Killed
their Populist Soul, The Atlantic Oct. 24, 2016 https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/10/howdemocrats-killed-their-populist-soul/504710/ (discussing perception by U.S. political leaders that
monopolies were fueling rise of fascism in pre-World War II period); Ajay Singh Chaudhary & Raphaël
Chappe, The Supermanagerial Reich, Los Angeles Review of Books Nov. 7, 2016
https://lareviewofbooks.org/article/the-supermanagerial-reich/#! (discussing Nazi’s facilitation of industrial
consolidation into “massive profit-generating monopolies”); Ganesh Sitaraman, Unchecked Power: How
monopolies have flourished—and undermined democracy, The New Republic Nov. 29, 2018
https://newrepublic.com/article/152294/unchecked-power (discussing relationship between the World War
II monopolies and today’s communications industry monopolies); Michael Reiger, Were the Nazis Really
Socialists? Foundation for Economic Education, Apr. 19, 2019 https://fee.org/articles/were-the-nazis-really9
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support for the Nazi regime are presentist and significant: establishing that industrial
concentration contributed to the rise of fascism and that industrial concentration is on the rise
in the United States lends support to those pushing urgently for a return to aggressive antitrust.
On the other hand, advocates of a less interventionist antitrust regime tend to dismiss the
assertion that industrial concentration was a significant factor in Hitler’s rise to power, noting
many social and political factors other than industrial organization explain Nazism and that big
business did not support Hitler until he was already in power.
My purpose in this Article is to provide a fresh examination of the historical record on the
relationship between monopoly power and the rise of the Nazi regime and to assess that
relationship using concepts from contemporary economic learning and antitrust analysis. More
particularly, in order to sharpen the ongoing debate over fascism and monopoly, I ask the
following research questions: (1) Did industrial concentration facilitate the rise of German
fascism; (2) was the problem overly large industrial organizations (i..e., “the Curse of Bigness”)
or rather organizations with excessive market power; (3) by what mechanisms did monopoly
facilitate fascism; and (4) what manner of antitrust regime would have been necessary and
sufficient to prevent the unholy relationship between big business and Nazism from developing?
To foreshadow the answer to each of these questions briefly, I find: (1) industrial concentration
did facilitate the rise of Nazism and, particularly, its consolidation of power; (2) although it is
not always possible to separate the effects of large business firms from that of market power,
market power did play a distinct role in facilitating Nazism; (3) the concentrated and cartelized
structure of the Weimar economy contributed to the consolidation of Nazi power through
several distinct mechanisms, including a Faustian bargain exchanging regime support for a
privileged monopoly position, lending organizational infrastructure to the regime, and steering
entire industries to the regime’s bidding through expanding and coercive cartel structures; and
(4) application of contemporary consumer-welfare oriented antitrust norms would have
prevented most of the paths of concentration of economic power that facilitated Hitler’s rise
and wars of aggression.
The organization of the remaining portions of this Article is as follows: Part I sets the stage
by reviewing the record of political reform efforts in antitrust that grew out of perceptions that
fascism ascended on the backs of monopolies. In particular, it reviews the work of the U.S.
occupation authorities to document and diagnose the role of monopolies and cartels in Hitler’s
rise to power and consolidation of totalitarian control, the influence of this learning on the
Celler-Kefauver Act of 1950 and the subsequent period of aggressive antitrust enforcement, and
the demise of this antitrust enthusiasm in the 1970s. It also surveys the influence of anti-Nazi
thinking in the formation of Ordoliberalism, an influential school of European antitrust in the
post-War period.
Part II examines the historical record on the relationship between the concentration of
economic power in Weimar Germany and the subsequent concentration of political power in
the Nazi regime. Section A surveys the increasing consolidation and cartelization of the
German economy from unification under Bismarck at the end of the nineteenth century up to
Hitler’s ascension to power in 1933. Section B considers the extent to which German heavy
industry supported the Nazi regime, showing that the large industrial firms were generally
reluctant to support Hitler prior to 1933, but provided critical support to the Nazi regime from
1933 forward. Section C conducts case studies of three leading industries--chemicals,
armaments, and electricity—showing both heterogeneity and significant common threads in the
socialists-it-depends-on-how-you-define-socialism/ (discussing whether or not the Nazi control of
monopolies could be considered socialist).
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attitudes and relationships of German heavy industry with respect to the Nazi regime and the
roles that different kinds of concentrated economic power played in facilitating Hitler’s
consolidation of political power.
Part III analyzes the mechanisms by which industrial concentration facilitated the rise and
dominance of fascism and groups them into five buckets: (1) a Faustian bargain in which
dominant firms exchanged financial and other material support for Hitler for implicit guarantees
that their dominant positions would be protected and furthered in the new regime; (2) the ability
of monopoly firms to lend the Nazi party bureaucratic and organizational resources capable of
dominating entire industries and swaths of German society at a time when the Nazis did not yet
have plenary control over other critical institutions, such as the government and the military;
(3) cartel structures that were easily appropriated by the Nazis to centralize power over industry,
coerce unwilling firms to follow the regime’s policies, monitor dissidents, and generally steer
the course of industry to the regime’s purposes; (4) the existence of “national champion” firms
that enabled Hitler’s rearmament plans and, through cartel agreements with foreign firms,
undermined the Allies’ war readiness; and (5) centralization of power and loss of democratic
features within monopoly firms that became intermeshed with the Nazi apparatus.
Finally, Part IV asks whether the history of German fascism lends support to the claim that
antitrust law and enforcement need to take into account political and democratic values
explicitly and not simply advance economic efficiency and consumer welfare. It shows that
most of the conduct that created the economic conditions that facilitated Hitler’s rise would be
prohibited even under the consumer welfare standard that governs contemporary antitrust law
in the United States. While this by no means proves that “consumer welfare antitrust would
have stopped Hitler,” it is relevant to ongoing debates about antitrust policy to observe that the
cartelization, monopolistic mergers, and naked market division agreements that pervaded
Weimar Germany would not be tolerated under contemporary antitrust norms.
I. ANTITRUST’S ANTI-FASCIST TURN AND ITS DEMISE
In the wake of the Second World War, spurred by political leaders who attributed
Hitler’s rise to the over-concentration of the German economy, the United States Office of
Military Government (“OMGUS”) undertook an extensive “Decartelization” project in
Germany. Although the project was shuttered in 1949 without yielding significant fruit on
German soil, the research and documentation done by the Decartelization team contributed
intellectually to subsequent programs of heightened antitrust enforcement in the United States
and Europe. The two regimes were subject to different influences and took different paths, but
they shared a common underlying concern about the role that economic concentration had
played in the rise of fascism in Europe. With the passage of time and the confluence of events,
the anti-fascist strand of antitrust law has eroded—to the point of oblivion in the United States
and near-oblivion in Europe.
A. The Lost Concern of the Post-War Congress
1. Investigating Germany’s Monopolies and Cartels
Already before American entry into the Second World War, American political leaders
argued that cartels and monopolies were propelling the rise of fascism. In a 1938 address,
President Roosevelt asserted that essence of fascism was “the growth of private power to a point
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where it becomes stronger than their democratic state itself.” 15 With the advent of war,
American political rhetoric linking fascism to industrial monopolization and cartelization
increased. In the winter of 1943-44, the U.S. Senate Subcommittee on War Mobilization of the
Committee of Military Affairs held hearings on the influence of German cartels and monopolies
in Hitler’s rise to power and cooption of American industry. 16 Senator Harley Kilgore, who
chaired the committee, would later write that “the cartel system, in great measure, was
responsible” for Hitler’s dictatorship as the cartels’ “funds and influence made possible Nazi
seizure of power.” 17 In September of 1944, President Roosevelt characterized Germany’s
cartels as “weapons of economic warfare” that would have to be eradicated along with the
Wehrmacht. 18
As victory neared in Europe, the U.S. military prepared to carry out the President’s
directive to decartelize Germany. In April of 1945, General Eisenhower issued an order to the
U.S. Army to “prohibit all cartels or other private business arrangements and cartel-like
organizations.” 19 The Potsdam Agreement of August 1945 provided that “[a]t the earliest
possible date, the German economy shall be decentralized for the purpose of eliminating the
present excessive concentration of economic power as exemplified in particular by cartels,
syndicates, trusts and other monopolistic arrangements.” 20 A U.S. Decartelization Branch was
established on December 15, 1945 as a branch of the Economics Division of the U.S. Office of
Military Government (“OMGUS”), with a mandate to deconcentrate and decartelize German
industry. 21 The Decartelization Branch explicitly linked its economic and political goals:

peak. 23

The Decartelization Branch, acting with and through other Military
Government activities should, therefore, make every effort to teach the German
people that political democracy cannot long survive the disappearance of
economic democracy, and that the freedom of the individual consumer to buy
and sell in freely competitive markets is the economic philosophy must suitable
to their needs. 22
The Decartelization Branch was well-staffed, with 94 lawyers and investigators at its
It was largely responsible for the break-up of the I.G. Farben chemical combine

Message from the President of the United States Transmitting Recommendations Relative to the
Strengthening and Enforcement of Anti-trust Laws,
https://www.jstor.org/stable/1805350?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents.
16
J.F.J. Gillen, Deconcentration and Decartelization in West Germany 1945-1953, Historical Division
Office of the Executive Secretary, Office of the U.S. High Commissioner for Germany 6 (1953)
(preliminary draft in files of Creighton R. Coleman).
17
Senator Harley M. Kilgore, Introduction to Darel McConkey, Out of YOUR Pocket, the Story of Cartels,
3d ed. (1947).
18
John C. Stedman, The German Decartelization Program—The Law in Repose, 17 U. Chi. L. Rev. 441,
441 (1950).
19
Tapper, supra n. xxx at 151.
20
SEN. FOREIGN REL. COMM. STAFF, A DECADE OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY: BASIC DOCUMENTS, 194149, (1950).
https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=mdp.39015019162257;view=1up;seq=56; see also J.F.J. Gillen,
Deconcentration and Decartelization in West Germany 1945-1953, Historical Division Office of the
Executive Secretary, Office of the U.S. High Commissioner for Germany (1953) (preliminary draft in files
of Creighton R. Coleman).
21
Decartelization in the U.S. Zone of Germany 1 (December 1948) (Creighton papers).
22
Program and Aims of the Decartelization Branch, March 28, 1946, at 6.
23
Stedman, supra n. xxx at 443.
15
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(discussed in greater detail in Part II below) in 1945. 24 Thereafter, it identified an additional 70
firms or cartel organizations as potential targets for break-up or dissolution. 25 A February 12,
1947 decartelization law promulgated by OMGUS gave further legal status to the
Decartelization unit’s efforts. 26 Nonetheless, the Farben break-up proved to be the program’s
one substantial achievement. The program was largely shuttered in 1949, depleted of personnel
and demoralized. 27 The Secretary of the “Ferguson Committee” that investigated the operation
of the German decartelization program and rendered a critical report on it opined that a variety
of factors contributed to the program’s failure including confusion over the program’s aims and
objectives, lack of support by American allies, lack of support by the German people, and lack
of support from American officials and the American business community. 28
If the Decartelization program failed to achieve significant remedial results in the
German economy, it nonetheless provided a useful service by thoroughly researching and
reporting on the concentrated and cartelized state of the German economy and the role of that
concentration and cartelization in the rise and perpetuation of the Nazi regime. The program’s
reports on specific firms and industries and on the history and nature of German industrial
concentration and cartelization more generally became focal points for subsequent political
discourse and reforms concerning concentration in the American economy, most particularly
with respect to the Celler-Kefauver Act of 1950.
2. The Anti-Fascist Roots of the Celler-Kefauver Amendment to Section 7 of the Clayton
Act
In 1950, Congress enacted the Celler-Kefauver Act, substantially expanding Section 7
of the Clayton Act of 1914, which prohibits anticompetitive mergers. At a technical level,
Celler-Kefauver accomplished three things: (1) closing the “asset loophole,” which had allowed
merging firms to escape Section 7’s coverage through asset rather than stock acquisitions; (2)
deleting “acquiring-acquired” language in the original text of Section 7 that could be read to
limit Section 7 to horizontal mergers and exclude coverage of vertical and conglomerate
mergers; and (3) clarifying that Section 7 reached “incipient” trends toward increasing
concentration levels which might threaten competition. In a more general sense, CellerKefauver served up a Congressional mandate for a post-War program of intensive anti-merger
enforcement by the Justice Department and Federal Trade Commission from the 1950s through
the early 1970s to stem the perceived “rising tide of concentration” in the American economy. 29
As the Supreme Court acknowledged in Brown Shoe, the Act’s legislative history
reveals “Congress’ fear not only of accelerated concentration of economic power on economic
grounds, but also of the threat to other values a trend toward concentration was thought to
pose.” 30 Although the Supreme Court did not specify what “other values” Congress perceived
to be at stake, floor statements by the bill’s two primary sponsors—and New York Senator
Emanuel Celler and Tennessee Senator Estes Kefauver—reveal a preoccupation with the
political consequences of concentrated economic power, particularly in the correlation between
industrial cartelization and monopoly and the rise of fascism in pre-War Germany, and
Id. at 442.
Id. at 445.
26
Id. at 441.
27
Id. at 445.
28
Id. at 448-56.
29
Brown Shoe Co. v. U.S., 370 U.S. 294, 316 (1962).
30
Id.
24
25
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totalitarianism more broadly. Celler and Kefauver relied heavily on work generated from the
findings of the Decartelization Unit. Celler warned:
I want to point out the danger of this trend toward more and better combines. I
read from a report filed with former Secretary of War Royall as to the history of
the cartelization and concentration of industry in Germany:
Germany under the Nazi set-up built up a great series of industrial monopolies
in steel, rubber, coal and other materials. The monopolies soon got control of
Germany, brought Hitler to power and forced virtually the whole world into war.
The report continues:
A high degree of concentration throughout industry fosters the formation of
cartels and readily enables a war-minded government to mobilize for hostilities.
Such was the history of war preparations in Germany in both World War I and
World War II. 31
Senator Kefauver seconded Celler’s anti-totalitarian themes. The rising tide of concentration
would lead to totalitarianism of either the fascist or Stalinist variety:
I am not an alarmist, but the history of what has taken place in other nations
where mergers and concentrations have placed economic control in the hands of
a very few people is too clear to pass over easily. A point is eventually reached,
and we are rapidly reaching that point in this country, where the public steps in
to take over when concentration and monopoly gain too much power. The taking
over by the public through its government always follows one or two methods
and has one or two political results. It either results in a Fascist state or the
nationalization of industries and thereafter a Socialist or Communist state. Most
businessmen realize this inevitable result. Certain monopolistic interests are
being very short-sighted in not appreciating the plight to which they are forcing
their Government. 32
Celler and Kefauver’s floor speeches reflected a broader concern of the U.S. Congress and other
national institutions that industrial concentration facilitated the incubation of totalitarianism and
threatened democracy. 33 Senator Charles Kersten of Wisconsin linked the dangers of “big
95 Cong. Rec. 11, 486 (1949). Celler continued by quoting Walter Lippmann
of Fortune magazine as follows:
31

The development of combinations in business, which are able to dominate markets in which
they sell their goods, and in which they buy their labor and materials, must lead irresistibly to
some form of state collectivism. So much power will never for long be allowed to rest in
private hands, and those who do not wish to take the road to the politically administered
economy of socialism, must be prepared to take the steps back toward the restoration of the
market economy of private competitive enterprise.
96 Cong. Rec. 16,452 (1950).
See generally Pitofsky, supra n. xxx (1979); Wu, Curse of Bigness, supra n. xxx at 81 (noting that
Celler-Kefauver Act “was explicitly styled as a reaction to the German and Soviet examples); Lina M. Khan,
The Ideological Roots of America’s Market Power Problem, 127 Yale L. J. F. 960, 966 (2018) (“The CellerKefauver Act, a supplementary antitrust law, was passed in 1950 due to fears that excessive consolidation
32
33
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government” and “business so big that it is monopolized in the hands of a few.” 34 Senator
William Langer of North Dakota introduced into the record a March 26, 2017 Christian Science
Monitor article warning of the “danger . . . for any democracy which allows economic
concentration of power to spread at the expense of small business.” 35 For its part, the Federal
Trade Commission warned that “[i]f nothing is done to check the growth in concentration, either
the giant corporations will ultimately take over the Country or the Government will be impelled
to step in and impose some form of direct regulation... in either event, collectivism will have
triumphed over free enterprise.” 36
The period of post-war anti-merger enthusiasm, which lasted roughly from 1950 to the
mid-1970s, thus reflected, at its core, a deep concern that industrial concentration threatened
the democratic order, as evidenced by the recent experience with Nazism.
2.

Post-War Anti-Merger Enthusiasm and Its Demise

The Celler-Kefauver Act empowered the federal antitrust agencies to pursue an antimerger agenda that included successful challenges to many mergers that posed little, if any,
immediate threat of oligopolistic concentration. The federal courts largely rubber-stamped the
agencies’ enforcement agenda in the 1950s through the mid-1970s, leading Justice Stewart
famously to complain in dissent that “the sole consistency that I can find is that in litigation
under s 7, the Government always wins.” 37
The period of enthusiastic merger-busting subsided in the mid-1970s as a result of two
distinct forces. One was the rise of the Chicago School of economic analysis, which had been
mounting a critique of post-War antitrust since at least the 1950s and succeeded in conquering
the Supreme Court by the late 1970s. The Supreme Court signaled a turn toward Chicago in
one of its last major merger decisions of the 1970s, General Dynamics, 38 shortly after which it
got out of the merger business entirely. The Court has not decided a merger case on the merits
since 1976.
And, not coincidentally. that was also the year of the second distinctive force that ended
the era of enthusiastic merger-busting—the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act which created a pre-merger
notification system and effectively shifted merger review out of the courts and into the agencies,
from an adjudicatory model to an administrative model. 39 This completed Post-Hart-Scott
could deliver fascism”); but see Robert H. Lande, Wealth Transfers as the Original and Primary Concern of
Antitrust: The Efficiency Interpretation Challenged, 50 Hastings L. J. 871, 956 (1999) (“The dramatic
statements in the legislative history of the Celler-Kefauver Antimerger Act probably reflect less a fear of
imminent fascism than a desire to curb increases in industrial concentration for a large number of social and
political reasons.”).
Remarks by Mr. Kersten in the House on H.R. 7024, August 7, 1948, 94 Cong. Rec. 10241-42
(1948) Debate: 94 Congressional Record (Bound Edition) - 80thCongress, 2nd Session - 1948: Document
No. 59.
35
Extensionary Remarks by Mr. Langer on Mergers through a Loophole, June 4, 1948, 94 Cong. Rec.
A3552 (1948)Debate: 94 Congressional Record (Bound Edition) - 80th Congress, 2nd Session - 1948:
Document No. 56, page A352.
36
Washington: FTC Asks Congress to Curb Corporations,” Detroit Free Press (Jul. 26, 1948) at 4
(available at http://proxy.lib.umich.edu/login?url=https://search-proquestcom.proxy.lib.umich.edu/docview/1817302297?accountid=14667).
37
U.S. v. Von’s Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 302 (1966) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
38
U.S. v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486 (1974).
39
Crane, Technocracy, supra n. xxx.
34
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merger control settled into a technocratic data-crunching exercise by professional economists
more interested in the predictive power on prices and output from changes in the HerfindahlHirschman Index than the veiled specter of fascism.
Chicago and Hart-Scott killed the aggressively anti-incipiency version of Celler and
Kefauver’s project, but what happened to the concern with economic concentration leading to
political concentration? Many different forces, including dimming collective memory of the
war, distrust of governmental institutions post-Watergate, and the rise of the consumerist
movement had a hand in the demise of the anti-merger regime. But one particular angle has the
strongest explanatory power: The anti-fascist political strain of Celler-Kefauver ideology
coincided so neatly with the rising economic theory of anti-merger enforcement—
structuralism—that the two lines became intermeshed and inseparable. Then, when Chicago
demolished structuralism empirically and theoretically to the point that even leading
structuralists admitted error and moved on, structuralism pulled down anti-fascism in its
collapse. Anti-fascism was effectively subsumed in structuralism, and hence shared its fate.
Few schools of antitrust thought have enjoyed such temporal success as the structuralist
school, which came to become known as the Harvard School because of its association with
Harvard professors Carl Kaysen, Donald Turner, and Phil Areeda and Joe Bain, a Harvardtrained economist who spent the bulk of his career at the University of California at Berkeley. 40
Structuralism’s core and elegant tenet was that a strong, deterministic relationship exists
between a market’s structure, conduct, and performance (thus giving rise to the StructureConduct-Performance or just S-C-P paradigm). Concentration was the most significant
component of structure. Thus, a highly concentrated market inexorably led to anticompetitive
firm behavior, and such behavior inexorably led to poor market performance, expressed as
higher prices and lower quality. The upshot was that the government could directly attack
concentrated market structures without worrying about the specific mechanisms (conduct) that
led from that structure to poor market performance. 41
Structuralism prevailed in the academy, antitrust agencies, courts, and political
institutions until the mid-1970s. In late 1967, President Lyndon Johnson secretly asked Phil
Neal, Dean of the University of Chicago Law School, to lead a commission of distinguished
See generally Leonard W. Weiss, The Structure-Conduct-Performance Paradigm and Antitrust, 127 U.
Pa. L. Rev. 1104 (1979); Herbert Hovenkamp, United States Competition Policy in Crisis: 1890-1955, 94
Minn. L. Rev. 311, 350-354 (2009).
41
At a theoretical level, structuralism rested on four broad theoretical and empirical propositions. First,
the structuralists assumed a strong link between the number of firms in a market and the propensity of prices
to rise above cost. This claim rested principally on strong assumptions, formalized by the nineteenth century
French mathematician Augustin Cournot, that oligopoly behavior would increase as the number of firms
decreased. The structuralists claimed that the Cournot assumptions were borne out by empirical studies
showing that firms in concentrated industries earned higher profits than those in more competitively
structured industries. Second, echoing a theme from Louis Brandeis, the structuralists rejected the notion
that large aggregations of capital were necessary to achieving economies of scale. While economies of scale
did exist, in many markets the firms were far larger than minimum efficient scale demanded; such markets
could be “deconcentrated” by breaking up large firms without causing significant production inefficiencies.
Third, the structuralists claimed that barriers to entry were high in many industries, but particularly in those
with a large fixed cost component. The Harvard School’s broad definition of entry barriers would raise a
strong challenge from the Chicago School, which gave a much narrower definition to entry barriers—with
the implication that far fewer markets would considered difficult to enter. Fourth, Kaysen-Turner argued
that, given the close link between Cournot theory and maximizing behavior, poor performance in highly
concentrated markets was inevitable. As a result, antitrust should focus on structure and pay relatively less
attention to conduct.
40
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economists and lawyers to report on the state of competition in the United States and
recommend potential changes to the antitrust laws. 42 Johnson intended to use the report as part
of his reelection campaign, but eventually decided not to seek reelection because of the
unpopularity of the Vietnam War. 43 Nonetheless, the Commission concluded its work and
released its report. The Report represented the high water mark of structuralist thinking. It
proposed a Concentrated Industries Act that would give the Attorney General a mandate to
“search out” oligopolies and order divestiture to the point that no firm would end up with a
market share exceeding 12 percent. It also proposed a much stronger structuralist presumption
in horizontal merger cases, condemning any merger in which the four-firm concentration ratio
exceeded 50 percent and one of the firms involved in the merger had a market share exceeding
10 percent.
None of the Report’s recommendations was adopted into law. Not only did Richard
Nixon’s election kill off its immediate political prospects, but by the early 1970s the Chicago
School was rapidly eroding structuralism’s theoretical and empirical assumptions. In the 1970s,
Turner underwent a self-described “conversion experience” in which he accepted many of the
Chicago School critiques of the SCP paradigm. 44 Vestiges of structuralist thinking appeared as
late as 1979 when Jimmy Carter’s National Commission to Review Antitrust Law and
Procedures recommended adoption of a no-fault monopolization statute and in various
iterations of the Justice Department and Federal Trade Commission’s Horizontal Merger
Guidelines, but the S-C-P paradigm had long since been intellectually and politically
vanquished. The Harvard School that undergirded the anti-merger regime of the 1950s and 60s
morphed into a neo-Harvard School that focused on institutionalism (the institutional and
procedural mechanisms of antitrust enforcement) rather than structuralism as a theory of market
behavior. 45
Structuralism’s claims were distinct from the anti-totalitarian claims of Celler and
Kefauver. S-C-P was a “purely descriptive economic theory,” if such a thing exists. All of
Chicago’s empirical and theoretical refutations of S-C-P could have been well taken without
touching the separate Celler-Kefauver claim that an aggressive industrial deconcentration
regime was necessary to prevent the consolidation of political power and erosion of democracy.
Nonetheless, the temporal coincidence and prescriptive alignment of the political and economic
theories contributed to the demise of the political theory when the economic theory fell. Merger
policy in the 1970s concerned the predictive power of the S-C-P’s models; once those models
were discredited, Celler-Kefauver’s political project largely ended too without separate
examination.
B. Fascism and European Ordoliberalism
The fate of the anti-fascist strand of American antitrust law can be contrasted with
another post-War, anti-fascist antitrust ideology that has had a much longer political run—the
Ordoliberalism of the Freiburg School that continues to exert influence in the European Union.
Ordoliberalism has its roots in pre-War Germany largely as a reaction to the failure of the
42
Herbert Hovenkamp, Introduction to the Neal Report and the Crisis in Antitrust & A Reprint of the Neal
Report, 5 Comp. Pol’y Intl’l 217 (2009).
43
Id.
44
HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE: PRINCIPLE AND EXECUTION 37 (2005).
45
William E. Kovacic, The Intellectual DNA of Modern U.S. Competition Law for Dominant Firm
Conduct: The Chicago/Harvard Double Helix, 2007 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 1 (2007).
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Weimar state and the rise of Nazism. 46 Franz Böhm, Walter Eucken, and Hans GrossmannDoerth, professors at Freiburg, penned their Ordo Manifesto in 1936 amid the dominion of
National Socialism and were elevated to prominence during the Allied reconstruction of
Germany. 47
Methodologically, the Ordoliberals lamented the compartmentalization of academic
disciplines, particularly economics. According to Eucken, “during the nineteenth century
economic thought gradually had become isolated, and economists had lost sight of both the
political and social contexts of economic issues.” 48 As a result, the liberal tradition had become
narrowly associated with laissez faire political ideology. The Ordoliberals sought to promote
moralistic and humane values by fusing economic and legal understanding into a
comprehensive account of a just and liberal social order.
Competition entered the Ordoliberal framework not merely as instrumental to achieving
consumer or social welfare, but as a fundamental requirement of social justice and a wellfunctioning democratic society. Free economic participation by all citizens was the primary
channel for achieving liberal and humane values. Market power by individuals or firms stood
in the way of this goal. According to the Ordoliberalsm, “[t]he problems of Weimar
and Nazi Germany were attributable in part to the inability of the legal system to control and, if
necessary, to disperse private economic power.” 49 Accordingly, the state had an affirmative
obligation to promote market competition in order to secure liberal goals.
A major point of difference between Ordoliberalism and mainstream Anglo-American
traditions is that the Freiburg School conceived of competition principles as bedrock
constitutional principles operating on both the state and private actors. Although the U.S.
Supreme Court has described the Sherman Act as the “magna carta of free enterprise,” 50 the
U.S. antitrust laws have never been understood as constitutional in any meaningful sense. The
government has no affirmative obligation to protect any private firm or individual from
monopolistic oppression. It may and frequently does exempt large actors from antitrust scrutiny
and, more generally, make judgments about what degrees of market power are tolerable or
intolerable insofar as they promote or retard efficiency.
By contrast, the Ordoliberals understood the promotion of individual economic freedom
as a core obligation of the state. Freedom, in this lexicography, meant the absence of arbitrary
control by private actors. Even if concentrations of market power could advance economic
efficiency, the government could not permit such concentrations without compromising the
liberal interest in personal freedom. As Böhm explained, “[i]f we want freedom, we have no
option but to sacrifice some advantage which we could obtain only by employing concentrated
power.” 51
Ordoliberalism resonated with Brandeisian atomistic competition values and the belief
in antitrust law as creating a level playing field and economic opportunity. Consistent with
antitrust’s historical tendency to draw support from both right and left, 52 the Ordoliberal
David J. Gerber, Constitutionalizing the Economy: German Neo-Liberalism, Competition Law and the
“New” Europe, 42 Am. J. Comp. L. 25, (1994).
47
Crane & HOVENKAMP, SUPRA N. XXX; VOLKER R. BERGHAHN, THE AMERICANIZATION OF WEST
GERMAN INDUSTRY 1945-1973 at 84-110 (1986).
48
Id. at 237.
49
RICHARD WHISH, COMPETITION LAW 20 (5th ed. 2003);
50
U.S. v. Topco Assoc., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972).
51
Crane & Hovenkamp, supra n. xxx.
52
Crane, Antitrust’s Unconventional Politics, supra n. xxx.
46
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tradition resonated with some on the populist-libertarian right like Friedrich von Hayek who
maintained close intellectual connections to the Freiburg School and made frequent
contributions to the ORDO journal. 53
Partly owing to its lineage as an anti-Nazi ideology and its proponents’ anti-Nazi
credentials, Ordoliberalism grew in favor during the post-War era. With West Germany’s
meteoric economic growth paralleling the rise of European integration and the creation of
European-wide antitrust principles, Ordoliberalism was poised to become an important—
perhaps the dominant—European antitrust ideology. Comparativists often explain divergences
between U.S. and EU antitrust law in recent decades as founded on Europe’s Ordoliberal
commitments that have no analogue in contemporary U.S. antitrust ideology. 54
Ordoliberalism, like Celler-Kefauver anti-concentrationism, linked industrial pluralism
with political pluralism and owed its ascent to the demise of mid-century fascism. Why, then,
did Ordoliberalism survive as an antitrust ideology in Europe long after anti-fascism faded as
an antitrust ideology in the United States? The lines of influence are many and complex, but
an important differentiating factor was that Ordoliberalism never became conceptually and
politically comingled with a “purely economic” theory of concentration and oligopoly, as
occurred with respect to the Celler-Kefauver legacy in the United States. Ordoliberalism
remained a moral theory of coercion and restraint that recognized the possible efficiency costs
of a deconcentrated economy and demanded it nonetheless in light of recent European
experience. Hence, when the assault on economic structuralism arrived in the 1970s, European
Ordoliberalism did not find its fundamental claims threatened.
In recent years, the European Commission has stated a goal of moving away from a
“form-based” approach to an “effects-based” approach to competition law issues, which is
widely seen as throwing down the gauntlet to Ordoliberalism. 55 This is occurring at a time
when the economics profession has moved somewhat away from the more laissez faire
prescriptions of the Chicago School, so the implications for European antitrust law are not as
liberalizing as the Chicago assault on structuralism in the 1970s. Still, this shift, if ultimately
endorsed by other elite European institutions (particularly the General Court and Court of
Justice) could bring to a close the post-War European experiment with antitrust as an explicitly
democracy and pluralism-reinforcing institution. It is perhaps a sign of antitrust’s inherently
cyclical nature that Europe appears to be moving away from a political conception of antitrust
just as that theme is re-emerging in American political discourse.
****
Both the United States and Europe experienced periods—albeit a longer one in
Europe—in which the shades of Nazism and the role of monopolies and cartels in supporting
the Third Reich motivated the dominant antitrust ideology of the day, at least in part. On both
sides of the Atlantic, those influences have waned over time as antitrust has become more
technocratic and focused on efficiency and consumer welfare. Today, as the political value of
antitrust as a democracy-reinforcing instrument is under reexamination at the highest levels in
Washington, the forgotten learning of the post-War period deserve reexamination as well. But
53

Id.
See generally Silvia Beltrametti, Capturing the Transplant: U.S. Antitrust Law in the European Union,
48 Vand. J. Trans. L. 1147 (2015).
55
Pierre Larouche, The European Microsoft Case at the Crossroads of Competition Policy: Comment on
Ahlborn and Evans, 75 Antitrust L. J. 933, 962 (2009).
54
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the political rhetoric of the post-War era linked German industrial concentration and
cartelization and the Nazi regime should not be accepted without critical examination. As
discussed below, many scholars have questioned the degree to which German heavy industry
actually supported Hitler and some have urged caution in accepting the characterizations of the
Decartelization Unit, which have been described as the product of zealous American
trustbusters and prosecutors primarily concerned about playing to a domestic American
audience and supporting an enhanced antitrust regime in the United States. 56 Drawing on the
work of the Decartelization Unit and independent historical sources, the following sections
assess the evidence concerning the relationship between Germany industrial concentration and
cartelization and the rise of Hitler.
II. GERMAN INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION AND THE NAZI REGIME
A. The Cartelization and Consolidation of German Industry from Bismarck to the Third
Reich
The roots of German industrial consolidation leading up to the monopolization and
cartelization of industry under the Third Reich run back to the unification of Germany under
Otto von Bismarck. Professor Wilhelm Roepke identified 1879 as the year when Germany
began a transformation from free trade to cartelization (control of an industry through
orchestration by a number of firms) and monopolization (dominance of an industry by one or
two leading firms) as Bismarck push an industrial policy supporting “hierarchical organization
and centralization” of all aspects of economic life. 57 Cartelization began to grow rapidly in the
German economy, with German courts upholding and enforcing cartel agreements in the last
decades of the nineteenth century. 58 Cartelization was not only tolerated, but actively
encouraged by state policy. An 1888 Bavarian Supreme Court decision declared that “it is
incumbent on prudent businessmen belonging to a branch of industry which is suffering from
depression to get together and enter into agreements regulating the ways and means of operating
their industry with a view to promoting recovery.” 59 In 1897, just at the U.S. Supreme Court
was interpreting the Sherman Act to foreclose the argument that cartel agreements were
necessary to prevent “ruinous competition” and establish “reasonable prices,” 60 the German
Supreme Court was accepting just such assertions. 61
Despite occasional political contestation over the benefits of cartelization, the number of
Gerald D. Feldman, Financial Institutions in Nazi Germany: Reluctant or Willing Collaborators?, in
BUSINESS AND INDUSTRY IN NAZI GERMANY 15 (Francis R. Nicosia & Jonathan Huener, eds. 2004); see also
Feldenkirchen at 8 (criticizing Siemens report’s assessments as “very much the product of their time” and
inconsistent with the “current state of research.”).
57
WILHELM ROEPKE, THE SOLUTION OF THE GERMAN PROBLEM (xxx); see also JOHN O. HALEY,
ANTITRUST IN GERMANY AND JAPAN: THE FIRST FIFTY YEARS, 1947-1998 7-8 (2001) (summarizing
Germany’s abandonment of free trade in 1870s and movement toward cartelization).
58
Report on German Cartels and Combines, Volume 1, German Economic Decentralization,
Decartelization Branch, Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.), March 1, 1947, at I-28-29.
59
EDWARD S. MASON, CONTROLLING WORLD TRADE: CARTELS AND COMMODITY AGREEMENTS 129
(1946).
60
U.S. v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass’n, 166 U.S. 290 (1897) (rejecting claim that railroad pooling
agreement was lawful under Section 1 of Sherman Act because prices charged were reasonable in light of
effects of excessive competition); see also U.S. v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, aff’d 175 U.S. 211
(1899) (rejecting arguments that “ruinous competition” justifies cartel agreements).
61
B. v. den Sächsischen Holzstoff-Fabrikanten-Verband, Reichsgericht (VI. Zivilsenat), Feb. 4, 1897, 38
R.G.Z. 155 (B. v. Saxon Woodpulps Manufacturers Ass'n); see also Decartelization Vol. 3, at I-28-29; Ivo E.
56
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cartels continued to grow during the imperial period, expanding from raw materials to
manufactured goods. 62 During the First World War, the German government moved from
tolerance of cartels to active compulsion, enforcing and managing price fixing agreements and
production quotas as part of the government’s industrial policy. 63 Following the war,
cartelization continued to grow rapidly, leading to some political backlash (mostly arising out
of Bavaria) concerning the effects of cartels on consumers. 64 The Government did little to arrest
the growing tide of cartelization until 1923, when it passed a Cartel Decree that, if anything,
reinforced the legal status and protection of cartels. 65 Although providing for the terminability
of cartel agreements by parties to the contract upon a showing of good cause and subjecting the
agreements to the control and supervision of the government, cartels were now given explicit
statutory recognition. 66 Further, the regulatory provisions were generally not enforced by the
government, which showed little interest in arresting the spread of cartelization. 67 German
courts continued to show little interest in reigning in cartels and monopolies. 68
Unfettered by a government ranging from complacent to affirmatively enthusiastic for
cartels, cartelization progressively swept through the German economy from the time of
Bismarck to the Third Reich. One German historian estimated the following numbers of cartel
agreements in Germany by year: 4 in 1865, 70 in 1887, 300 in 1900, 600 in 1911, 1,000 in 1922,
2,100 in 1930, and 2,500 by 1943. 69 These included most significant industries: coal, iron and
steel, steel processing, wire and cable, machinery, vehicles, non-ferrous metals, building
materials, chemicals, rubber, textiles, paper, printing, wood, electrochemical, optics, porcelain
and stoneware, glass, leather, sugar, food, and brewing and distilling. 70 Germany has been
called “the fatherland of the cartel movement.” 71
In the economic distress and disorganization that followed the First World War, many of
Germany’s cartels and syndicates found themselves in a state of decay, which paved the way
for the second stage of concentration—outright monopolization in many industries—facilitated

Schwartz, Antitrust Legislation and Policy in Germany: A Comparative Study, 105 U. Pa. L. Rev. 617, 626
(1957) (discussing holding in Woodpulps case).
62
Decartelization Vol. 3, at I-29-31.
63
Decartelization Vol. 3, at I-31.
64
Decartelization Vol. 3, at I-30-35.
65
Schwartz, supra n. xxx at 636-39; Peter D. Schapiro, The German Law Against Restraints of
Competition—Comparative and International Aspects, 62 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 7 n. 38 (1962); Decartelization
Vol. 3, at I-35.
66
Schwartz, supra n. xxx at 636-39; Decartelization Vol. 3, at I-35.
67
Decartelization Vol. 3, at I-36.
68
See Decision of the Hanseatisches Oberlandesgericht, Jan. 14, 1925, 23 Kartellrundschau 256, aff'd by
the Reichsgericht (IV. Zivilsenat), Dec. 12, 1925, 24 Kartellrundschau 18 (“For business men to obtain a
monopoly is not, under general principles of civil law, unlawful even if such monopoly should in effect be at
variance with the interests of national economy.”); translated in Schwartz, supra n. xxx at 634.
69
Decartelization Vol. 3, at I-17; see also Turner, German Big Business, supra n. xxx at xix (reporting
“in excess of fifteen hundred [cartels] in industry alone by 1925); Hendrich Kronstein, The Dyamics of
German Cartels and Patents, 9 U. Chi. L. Rev. 643, 647 (1942) (reporting the existence of 450 German
cartels in 1901); Schwartz, supra n. xxx at 635 (reporting the existence of 3,000 German cartels in 1925).
70
Decartelization Vol. 3, at I-17-18.
71
Haley, supra n. xxx at 8; John C. Stedman, The German Decartelization Program--The Law in Repose,
17 U. CHI. L. REV. 441 (1949-1950); Heinrich Kronstein, The Dynamics of German Cartels and Patents.
II, 10 U. CHI. L. REV. 46 (1942); Heinrich Kronstein, The Dynamics of German Cartels and Patents. I,
9 U. CHI. L. REV. 643 (1942).
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by German bankers. 72 Many industries transitioned from tight cartelization to merger to
monopoly, as for example the chemical industry which merged from two cartels into a single
integrated firm in 1925. 73 The steel industry also moved through mergers and acquisitions in
the direction of large, vertically integrated conglomerates. 74 By the time the Nazis came to
power, significant swaths of the German economy were subject to monopolies or near
monopolies. These included, among many others:
o Wintershall Potash Works, controlling over two-thirds of the German potash
industry; 75
o Robert Bosch, GmbH, with a near-monopoly position in fuel-injection equipment
and magnets; 76
o Siemens & Halske A.G. and Allgemeine-Elektrizitaets-Geselleschaft (“AEG”),
collectively controlling over three-quarters of the electro-technical industry; 77
o I.G. Farben, with monopoly or near-monopoly shares in many segments of the
chemical industry. 78
o Zuendwaren-Monopolgesellschaft with a complete monopoly over all match sales
in Germany pursuant to a 1930 Reichstag law; 79
o Henschel und Sohn, GmbH, with a dominant position in locomotive and heavy
machine manufacturing. 80
o The Krupp armaments firm, with a monopoly over heavy artillery and many other
military product lines. 81
o Vereinigte Stahlwerke (United Steel Works), created in 1926 by the merger of
three major steel firms. 82
o The Degussa firm, with a dominant position in precious metals. 83
In sum, before Hitler came to power, the German economy had been thoroughly
cartelized and monopolized. A 1946 report of the Decartelization Branch summed up the
situation as follows:
[D]espite war, defeat, inflation, and depression, the concentration of German
industry proceeded without interruption as merger succeeded merger. By 1928 the
officers and directors of the principal combines were in a position to dictate national
economic policy, sometimes but not always in consultation with state officials. In
fact, companies such as Vereinigte Stahlwerke and I.G. Farben, producing wide
range of raw materials, semi-finished products and commodities themselves, and a
72
Report on German Cartels and Combines, Volume 3, Germany’s Major Industrial Combines,
Decartelization Branch, Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.), March 1, 1947, at III-1
(“Decartelization Vol. 3”).
73
Infra.
74
Haley, supra n. xxx at 8; Turner, German Big Business, supra n. xxx at xvii.
75
Decartelization Vol. 3 at III-2.
76
Decartelization in the U.S. Zone of Germany (December 1948) at 5 (“Decartelization A”).
77
Decartelization Vol. 3 at III-2.
78
Infra notes xxx –xxx.
79
Decartelization Vol. 3 at III-33.
80
Decartelization A at 5.
81
Infra.
82
Turner, German Big Business, supra n. xxx at xvii.
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vastly wider range through their numerous affiliates and subsidiaries, were in effect
an industrial dictatorship capable (should it suit their purposes) of reorganizing the
German state. 84
As previously noted, contemporary historians urge caution in relying on rhetorical
characterizations in the Decartelization Unit reports, which were made “for prosecutorial
purposes by persons who were also trustbusters,” and often were not well-steeped in German
economic history. 85 But whether or not the industrial giants that dominated Germany’s business
landscape in the Weimar period are rightly characterized as an “industrial dictatorship,” the
high degree of concentration and cartelization in the German industry and the monopolies’
practical power to reorganize the German state is beyond peradventure.
B. German Heavy Industry’s Support for the Nazi Regime
The historical record on heavy industry’s support for the Nazi regime is hotly contested.
Marxist-leaning historians have consistently taken the view that capitalist monopolies supported
Hitler’s ascent. 86 For instance, Dietrich Eichholtz, writing in East Germany in 1969, faulted
the “leading German monopolies” “for their initiative and leading role” in propelling the Nazi
march toward war. 87 By contrast, among non-Marxists there has been no such consensus, with
many taking the position that the captains of industry were largely not supportive of Hitler until
he was already in power, at which point they had no choice but to fall in line with the Nazi
regime. 88
Much of the dispute over the characterization of the historical record turns on questions
of timing. Adherents to the view that big business pushed Hitler’s ascent point to early support
from Fritz Thyssen of the steel combine, who began to contribute funds to Hitler’s coffers in
1923, 89 and Hjalmar Schacht of the Reichsbank. 90 On January 27, 1932, a year before Hitler
became Chancellor, Thyssen organized a meeting at the Industry Club of Dusseldorf to
introduce Hitler to leading industrialists. According to Thyssen’s first-person account
(published after he fell out with Hitler), the meeting resulted in “a number of large contributions
flow[ing] from the resources of heavy industry into the treasuries of the National Socialist
party.” 91 Similarly, OMGUS’s Decartelization Report claimed that, in the final years of the
Decartelization Vol. 3 at III-2.
Gerald D. Feldman, Financial Institutions in Nazi Germany: Reluctant or Willing Collaborators?, in
BUSINESS AND INDUSTRY IN NAZI GERMANY 15 (Francis R. Nicosia & Jonathan Huener, eds. 2004); see also
Feldenkirchen at 8 (criticizing Siemens report’s assessments as “very much the product of their time” and
inconsistent with the “current state of research.”).
86
Henry Ashby Turner, Jr., Big Business and the Rise of Hitler, 75 Am. Hist. Rev. 56, 56 (1969) (“For
Marxists, or at least those who adhere to the Marxist line, the answer to this question has never been a
problem. From the outset, they have viewed Naziism as a manifestation of ‘monopoly capitalism’ and the
Nazis as the tool of big business.”); George W. F. Hallgarten, Adolf Hitler and German Heavy Industry,
1931-1933, 12 J. Econ. Hist. 222, 222-23 (1952) (same).
87
1 Dietrich Eichholtz, Geschichte der deutschen Kriegswirtschaft, 1939-1945 90 (1969) (quoted in
translation in Feldenkirchen, supra n. xxx at 3.
88
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Weimar Republic, industrialists Emil Kirdorf used his influence in the domestic coal cartel to
levy assessments on every ton of coal mined or sold to raise money for the Nazis, 92 although
historians have questioned the extent of Kirdorf’s support for the Nazis before 1934. 93
Despite early support for Hitler by a few industrialists, the historical record does not bear
out claims that Germany’s monopolies and cartels were pining for Hitler’s rise or providing
material support to his ascension during most of the years of the Nazi party ascent from 1919
forward. Yale historian Henry Turner observed that “most of the political money of big
business went, throughout the last years of the republic, to the conservative opponents of the
Nazis” and that most of the business community backed Paul von Hindenburg against Hitler in
the 1932 presidential campaign. 94 Similarly, George Hallgarten observed that “[d]own to 1929
[the Nazi party] appears to have lived, in the main, on membership dues and individual gifts,
mainly from local South German producers. A donation by Fritz Thyssen in 1923 remained an
isolated fact.” 95
The situation changed with Hitler’s ascension as chancellor on January 30, 1933. Leading
industrialists, who were often more motivated by profits than political ideology, began to bet
on Hitler’s political future and its implications for their businesses. On February 20, 1933,
Hjalmar Schacht of the Reichsbank organized a meeting among Hitler, Hermann Göring, and
several dozen leading industrialists, including executives from the Krupp, Bosch, Farben, and
United Steel Works firms, during which Hitler promised to destroy the Marxists and re-arm
Germany. 96 The industrialists responded with enthusiasm, and Schacht collected three million
Reichsmarks in donations to the Nazis. 97 On February 27, 1933—perhaps not coincidentally
the day of the Reichstag fire—the I.G Farben chemical monopoly deposited RM 400,000 in the
Nazi Party’s coffers. 98 A succession of further donations followed, providing Hitler with a
source of extra-governmental funding even while he struggled to consolidate his power over
the state. As discussed further below, the Krupp armaments monopoly led a fundraising effort
among twenty other leading industrial firms a month later, raising millions of Reichmarks for
the Nazis. That these donations may have been made through “political extortion” and without
enthusiasm by the industrial donors, does not diminish the fact that they were made and that,
through them, “big business was helping consolidate Hitler’s rule.” 99
Although the best reading of the historical record suggests that most of the Weimar
monopolies and cartelists were not generally disposed to support Hitler and did not do so until
he was already grabbing the reins of power, this Article’s purpose is not to judge the ethical
responsibility of heavy industry for the rise of German fascism, but rather to understand the
ways in which the concentrated economic structure of industry may facilitate the rise of
totalitarian government. In this vein, it is important to make clear that the thesis that extremely
concentrated economic power facilitated Hitler’s rise to power is distinct from the controversy
that has occupied historians since the end of the Second World War about whether the Nazi
regime was an outgrowth of capitalism. In German Big Business and the Rise of Hitler, Turner
systematically debunked the claim that the captains of heavy industry deliberately boosted
Decartelization Vol. 3 at III-2.
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Hitler to power, which Turner saw as an inaccurate interpretation of history for anti-capitalist
ideological purposes. 100 Turner argued that support for Hitler was much more concentrated
among small businessmen, who felt trapped between the powerful and rapacious monopolies
and cartels, on the one hand, and the labor unions, on the other. 101 But that small business may
have supported Hitler’s rise while big business largely did not does prevent the concentrated
structure of German industry from having contributed significantly to Third Reich’s ascent, just
as other structures of German society may have facilitated the Nazis without being designed to
do so. Nor is it an indictment of capitalism in general to observe that extreme monopolization
and cartelization may pose a threat to democracy—capitalism, tended by anti-monopoly
principles, need not result in extreme monopolization and cartelization. Thus, the record of
German heavy industry’s lack of willing support for the rise of the Nazis before 1933 is only
one small piece of the wider story of how the steady cartelization and monopolization of the
German economy from the time of Bismarck to through the end of the Weimar Republic set the
stage for the fascist period that followed.
C. Concentration and Nazi Facilitation in Three Principal Industries
As discussed in the previous section, the story of big business support for Hitler is
contested, complex, and varied. This section presents case studies from three German
industries—chemicals, electricity, and armaments—that were critical to Hitler’s consolidation
of power, Germany’s rearmament, and its wars of aggression. Each industry was dominated by
one or two large firms subsequently charged with war crimes. The case studies reveal both the
heterogeneity and homogeneity of the relationship between monopoly and fascism. On the one
hand, the principal firms differed in their enthusiasm for competition, monopolization, and
cartelization and in their support for the Nazi regime. On the other hand, all three industries
were characterized by high levels of economic concentration and played a role in Hitler’s
consolidation of political and economic power. The case studies that follow survey the paths
by which the leading firms in these industries rose to economic dominance, their attitudes
toward Nazism, what they concretely and specifically did to support it and when, and how they
benefitted from it once they had Hitler’s favor.
1. Chemicals
Among the German firms most important to the rise of Nazism and the perpetuation of its
atrocities none was more significant than the I.G. Farben chemical cartel. 102 A 1945 OMGUS
“Report on the Investigation of I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G.” concluded that Farben, although
“nominally a private business enterprise” was “in fact a colossal empire serving the German
State as one of the principal industrial cores around which successive German drives for world
conquest have been organized” and served as “a trump . . . that almost enabled Hitler and
Goering to extinguish the flame of freedom and human decency everywhere.” 103
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Ironically, for all of the headaches it would eventually induce, the story of I.G. Farben’s
rise to power begins with a growing German chemical company—Bayer—that introduced the
world to aspirin in 1899. 104 Inspired by the American trusts of the Gilded Age, which were just
beginning to receive serious antitrust scrutiny, Bayer entered into a pooling arrangement with
two other chemical companies—BASF and Agfa in 1904. 105 A rival chemical pool, headed by
the Hoechst firm and including six German chemical companies, formed in the same year. 106
The two rival pools operated as conventional cartels, including coordination on pricing, research
and development, investment decisions, market allocations, and entry into foreign markets. 107
In 1916, with the British making inroads at the Somme, the two pools began to fret about
the advent of foreign competition following the war. 108 These anxieties resulted in a
combination of the two trusts into a single mega-trust or profit-sharing pool, with the power to
enable industry-wide coordination with respect to pricing, research and development, patent
strategies, legal affairs, and insurance. 109 The cartel structure persisted until 1925, when the
pool’s nine members underwent a final corporate integration, merging into a single corporate
entity (albeit with a complex structure of subsidiaries and holdings). 110 Thereafter, until its
dissolution in the post-War era, Farben no longer operated as a “chemical cartel” as it is often
styled in the literature. In modern legal and economic terms, it was an integrated, widely held
corporation, with 140,000 shareholders. 111
After the great merger of 1925, Farben continued to extend its control over the German
chemical industry and adjacent sectors with importance to Germany’s re-armament project. A
series of 1926 agreements ceded control over the German explosives industry to Farben. 112 But
it was a 1930 market division agreement with the American company Standard Oil of New
Jersey, or Esso, that garnered the most critical attention after the commencement of hostilities.
In the convention of the times, Farben had long engaged in global market division
agreements with foreign rivals. A 1923 agreement with the American firm Winthrop
Chemical’s Sterling unit had allocated to Sterling the right to market aspirin in the United States,
some of the Commonwealth countries, and South America, and to Farben the rest of the
globe. 113 In 1925, Farben initiated similar discussions with Standard Oil, these on the question
of synthetic fuel. 114 After a five-year courtship, the negotiations resulted in the creation of the
Joint American Study Company (“JASCO”), a research and development joint venture that also
involved allocation of global markets for hydrogenated fuel. 115
Since Farben’s exclusive area was limited to Germany, the fuel market-division agreement
turned out to be relatively unimportant to subsequent war efforts. But a separate agreement
Jeffreys, supra n. xxx at 38. The I.G. Farben story has been extensively studied by scholars. The
leading works include Diarmuid Jeffreys, HELL’S CARTEL: IG FARBEN AND THE MAKING OF HITLER’S WAR
MACHINE (2008); Stephan H. Lindner, INSIDE IG FARBEN: HOECHST DURING THE THIRD REICH (2008); Peter
Hayes, INDUSTRY AND IDEOLOGY: IG FARBEN IN THE NAZI ERA (1987); Joseph Borkin, THE CRIME AND
PUNISHMENT OF I.G. FARBEN: THE UNHOLY ALLIANCE BETWEEN HITLER AND THE GREAT CHEMICAL
COMBINE (1978).
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turned out to be hugely damaging to U.S. interests. In addition to fuel, a form of synthetic rubber
called buna can be extracted from coal. The parties enlarged the JASCO agreement to include
joint research and development related to buna. Under the terms of the agreement, Standard
Oil was obliged to assign to Farben any patents and know-how related to buna production.116
Farben had no reciprocal obligation, although, in 1930, the parties had anticipated some sort of
collaboration on the marketing of buna. 117 However, as Germany remilitarized, Farben became
integrated into the Wehrmacht, and buna became strategically important to military
mobilizations, Farben began to drag its feet on sharing any proprietary information with
Standard Oil. 118 Other American manufacturers interested in manufacturing synthetic rubber,
such as Goodyear Rubber Company and Dow Chemical, unsuccessfully sought a patent license
from Standard Oil, which stalled them on a licensing arrangement due to being stalled
themselves by Farben. 119 The JASCO arrangement had the effect of delaying American
development of buna by a number of years.
After Pearl Harbor and the commencement of the war in the Pacific, American access to
rubber supplies from Southeast Asia faltered and access to synthetic rubber became critical. 120
Due to Farben’s cooption of Standard Oil under the JASCO agreement, American scientists
were far behind in developing their own way of producing buna, and it took an immense
expenditure of time and effort to catch up to the Germans. 121 The U.S. War Department
considered that the cooption of Standard’s buna research efforts by Farben “seriously imperiled
the war preparations of the United States.” 122 So did the United States Justice Department,
which indicted and convicted Standard Oil, six subsdiaries, and four executives on charges of
criminally conspiring with Farben to restrict trade in synthetic fuel and buna. 123
With Hitler’s rise to power in the early 1930s, Farben initially resisted Nazification,
worried about potential ill effects on its global business of becoming overly intertwined with a
controversial political party. 124 However, by the mid-1930s, the firm’s management had
acceded to the reality that alliance with the Nazis was critical to the continued success of the
Farben enterprise. The firm purged its Jewish managers, began making financial contributions
to Hitler’s slush fund, and began to align politically with the Nazis. 125 By 1935-36, as Hitler’s
rearmament project intensified, the firm become organizationally intermeshed with the
Wehrmacht. 126 From then until the end of the War, Farben effectively served as an industrial
branch of the Nazi regime, with profits continuing to flow to the firm’s managers and
shareholders.
The rewards to the Nazi alliance paid off handsomely. By the late 1930s, Farben controlled
almost all German chemical and synthetic production, including 100% of synthetic rubber,
100% of lubricating oils, 100% of serums, 90% of plastics, 88% of magnesium, 64% of
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explosives, and 75% of nitrogen. 127 Even during the economic downturn of the Great
Depression, Farben continued to earn handsome profits. 128
Following the Austrian Anschluss of 1938 and the German invasion of much of Europe
beginning the following year, Farben gobbled up the chemical industries in the conquered
territories, annexing them into the Farben empire. 129 Farben effectively served as the prime
economic arm of Germany’s European conquests, coercing firms in conquered territories to sell
cheaply or simply taking them over. Tragically, Farben also served as one of the many faces of
Third Reich evil, running a factory concentration camp at Auschwitz and supplying the Zyklon
B gas used to exterminate Jews and other prisoners. 130
After German capitulation in 1945, Farben fell under the control of the occupying forces.
Convinced that Farben’s global network of subsidiaries and interests remained a threat to the
free world, OMGUS set out immediately to dismantle the company. 131 In 1947, 24 Farben
executives were tried for war crimes at Nuremberg, with nine defendants ultimately found guilty
of committing war crimes and crimes against humanity through the plunder of public and
private property in territories that came under German occupation and five found guilty of
enslavement and deportation for slave labor of civilians. 132 In 1952, Farben was split into three
large companies—Bayer, Hoechst, and BASF—and six smaller firms.133 The pre-1904 market
was largely recreated, with substantial adjustments for the passage of time. Recently, Bayer
again make antitrust headlines because of its merger with Monsanto. 134
The cooption of monopoly firms as agents of the Nazi regime was not limited to firms of
enormous scale like Farben. The Third Reich selected even smaller-scale business partners that
could exercise exclusive control over industrial segments important to the regime’s goals, and
then ensured that the perpetuation and deepening of those firms’ monopoly power. For instance,
the Degussa chemical firm was one-tenth the size of Farben, but played a significant role in the
Nazi’s rearmament project and in the plundering of precious metals from the Jews. 135 From its
incorporation in 1873 through the Weimar period, Degussa was largely a niche player in
precious metals and specialty chemical products. 136 In the late 1920s and early 30s, Degussa
made a number of strategic acquisitions to strengthen its position in precious metals and also to
diversity into niche product lines like carbon black, an additive that could be used as an additive
to increase the durability of rubber tires. 137 In 1933, Degussa leveraged Nazi decrees against
Jewish-owned firms to buy up Degea AG, the leading producer of gas masks and radioactive
earth metals, at the same time as the Nazi regime issued decrees to eliminate competition to
Degussa in its carbon black development project. 138 The deeper Degussa became intermeshed
with the Nazi regime, the more it became an arm of Nazi industrial and political policy,
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eschewing even more lucrative product lines to focus on the Nazis’ priorities. 139
By 1937-38, Degussa was a full-fledged participant in the Nazis’ atrocities, plundering
Jewish-owned firms to increase its holdings and processing gold, silver, and platinum seized
from Jews in Germany. 140 Even though the profit margins from performing the processing
function were initially very low, Degussa took on this function in order to preserve its
dominance in previous metals and, hence, its position in the Nazi industrial hierarchy. 141 From
1939-41, Degussa processed 80% of the gold seized from German and Austrian Jews and shares
over 50% of other precious metals as well. 142 Thereafter, its dominant position reinforced, the
firm took an even larger role in processing precious metals seized from occupied territories. 143
With Farben, Degussa also took part in the manufacture of Zyklon B and the used of slave
labor. 144
2. Electricity
Like the chemical industry, the electrical industry played a significant role in Germany’s
industrial development during the early twentieth century, and it too transitioned from a
competitive market to an oligopoly dominated by two large firms—Siemens and Allgemeine
Elektricitats Gesellschaft (“AEG”). 145 An economic crisis in 1901/02 took a particularly harsh
toll on the electricity industry and enabled Siemens and AEG to gobble up a number of
distressed firms or jointly liquidate their smaller rivals in order to clear the market. 146 Siemens
and AEG emerged from this period of intensive consolidation with a combined share
approaching two-thirds of the market. 147 In the years leading up to the First World War, both
firms continued to acquire rival firms, thus solidifying their position of dominance. 148 During
the Depression, Siemens and AEG bought up yet additional failing rivals or, as during the
1901/02 crisis, jointly liquidated them. 149 The two firms held serious discussions about a
potential merger, but were ultimately unable to come to agreement. 150 Even without integration
through merger, AEG and Siemens quickly grew to a tremendous scale. At the outbreak of the
Second World War, Siemens employed 187,000 workers, making it among the top five largest
firms in the world. 151 By 1944, AEG and its subsidiaries 152employed more than 200,000
workers.
In addition to consolidation through acquisition or joint liquidation, the electrical industry
achieved anticompetitive coordination through cartels that fixed prices and imposed marketing
quotas on a wide variety of electricity-related submarkets. 153 For example, a 1903 cartel
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agreement between Siemens, AEG, and F&G-Lahmeyer committed the firms to a secret
“business sharing” arrangement where the firms essentially agreed not to compete against one
another in bids to public works or industrial plants. 154 Siemens and AEG also entered into a
variety of bilateral cooperation agreements, including the opening of several jointly owned
subsidiaries, 155 and worked together to undermine or weaken smaller rivals that had reached a
level of production that threatened the two big firms. 156 At its height, Siemens participated in
more than 1,000 foreign and domestic cartel agreements. 157
The House of Siemens did not welcome Hitler’s rise to power. Carl Friedrich von Siemens,
the family patriarch, supported the democratic German People’s Party up through the March
1933 elections—several months after Hitler had assumed the Chancellorship—and the family
thereafter participated reluctantly in the Nazi regime. 158 Still, the highly concentrated structure
of the electrical industry—produced through decades of mergers, liquidation of rivals, and cartel
activity—facilitated the Nazis’ projects of centralizing political and economic power and
rearming Germany for wars of aggression. The Nazis quickly seized on the consolidated and
cartelized structure of the electrical industry to force it within the party’s control and reorient
the industry to remilitarization. 159 In November of 1933, the Nazis reconstituted the
Zentralverband de Deutschen Elektrotechnischen Industrie (Central Association of the German
Electrical Industry, “ZVEI”)—the association of electrical industry cartels formed in 1918—
into the Reichsfachverband Elektroindustrie (“RFE”), effectively transforming the cartel
umbrella organization into an organ of the regime. 160 Through this means and a succession of
additional decrees in 1934 and 1935, the Nazi brought the cartels under the direct control of the
regime and ensured that “[t]he self-governing industrial bodies were to feel responsible for
ensuring that the cartels, in all the measures they took, adhered to the economic policy of the
Reich government.” 161
Chief among the regime’s policies was rearmament, and the cartelized electrical industry
quickly bent to the regime’s will. As the Nazis increasingly employed the preexisting cartel
structure to remove “production and sales . . . from the sphere of entrepreneurial decision
making” and prevent “[t]he possibilities of pursuing an autonomous corporate policy,” electrical
“[c]ompanies were increasingly less able to resist integration into rearmament and the war
economy.” 162 Although political support for Hitler varied within the German electrical industry
as it did throughout many other facets of German society, the concentrated and cartelized
structure of the industry offered the Nazis an organizational structure that facilitated the
consolidation of economic—and hence political—power and the push toward the war.
With the advent of war, Siemens and AEG, like Farben, used their close connections with
the military to seize firms in occupied territory. 163 They also employed slave labor, about which
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reparations litigation has occurred in recent decades. 164 And, like Farben, cartel agreements
with U.S. electrical companies undermined U.S. war readiness. Siemens’s refusal to honor the
terms of a patent exchange agreement with California-based Bendix Aviation Company
“seriously handicapped the production of electrically-driven automatic pilots in the U.S” and a
separate cartel agreement with Beryllium Corporation of New York “resulted in limitation of
defense production in the U.S.” 165
3. Armaments
At the Nuremberg Military Tribunal, Justice Robert Jackson indicted the Krupp steel and
armaments concern as key supporters of the Nazi regime and its wars of aggression:
Four generations of the Krupp family have owned and operated the great
armament and munitions plants which have been the chief source of Germany’s
war suppliers. For over 130 years this family has been the focus, the symbol,
and the beneficiary of the most sinister forces engaged in menacing the peace of
Europe. 166
Although the firm patriarch was too mentally infirm to stand trial, most of Krupp’s directors
were convicted for employing slave labor and plundering occupied Europe in a subsequent war
crimes trial. 167 But though Krupp surely deserved blame for its conduct during the war, the
family firm’s attitude toward both cartelization and the Nazi regime were significantly different
from those of Farben and Siemens. In assessing the relationship between German industrial
concentration and the rise of fascism, it is important to avoid painting all firms and industries
with a broad brush, as often occurs when histories are being contested. Krupp’s dominance in
the armaments industry surely facilitated Hitler’s aggressive rearmament policies, but in some
very different ways than Siemens or Farben.
Krupp’s transition from a steel company to an armaments company in the late nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries reflects the limits of the cartelization and merger story to explain
the concentration of German industry and the need to identify additional sources of economic
concentration, such as long-term exclusive or semi-exclusive governmental procurement
relationships. One the one hand, the Krupp firm was generally averse to participation in cartel
agreements. Firm patriarch Alfred Krupp once remarked: “I hate the idea of fraternization with
our competitors, since nobody will do anything for us, and everyone just wants to derive some
benefits from such fraternization.” 168 The firm also resisted pressure to merge with other firms,
preferring the independence of the family-owned tradition 169 and declined to join the steel trust
in the mid-1920s. 170 On the other hand, in eschewing anticompetitive collusion and merger,
the Krupp firm steered toward a different strategy to avoid direct competition: moving away
from homogenous mass-market products subject to intense price competition and toward
cultivation of markets subject to long-term exclusivity and guarantees, namely military
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contracting. 171 In the run-up to the First World War, the firm engaged in intensive, arguably
cutthroat, competition to expand its market share in the supply of munitions and artillery
products to the German army. 172 When a rival firm attempted to sell a hydraulic recoil gun to
the army, Krupp asked the army for an exclusive contract, including lodging an appeal with
Wilhelm II. 173 When this gambit failed, Krupp secretly bought up shares of the rival firm in
order to hamper its investment ability. By the First World War, the German army had become
so reliant on Krupp to supply heavy artillery that Krupp had a near-monopoly. 174
The Treaty of Versailles and its implementing agreements required German demilitarization and for Krupp to exit the arms business. 175 On the surface, Krupp shifted back
towards its mid-nineteenth century roots in manufacturing finished commercial products like
railway cars, but almost immediately it began a secret campaign to retain its arms-building
capacity, with the sanction of the German army. 176 By the mid-1920s, Krupp had furtively
developed “eight types of heavy artillery, howitzers, and light field guns a new mobile 21-cm
mortar; and the tank family.” 177 Years before the Nazis’ first electoral successes, the House of
Krupp had been mass producing tanks for the German army and tightening its grip as the
monopoly supplier of German arms and as one of the largest firms in the world. 178 At Hitler’s
ascension, the head of the Krupp family bragged that “he had the honor to report to the Führer
that stood ready after a short warm-up to begin the rearmament of the German people without
any gaps of experience.” 179
This is not to say that Krupp immediately supported the Nazis—despite the financial
benefits of remilitarization, the family was initially skeptical of Hitler. 180 George Hallgarten has
observed that family-owned enterprises like Krupp were significantly less likely to support
Hitler than were widely held firms: “It would appear that the old industrial families of the Ruhr
feared Hitler’s budding totalitarianism much more strongly than did the directors of anonymous
companies who live by big salaries, instead of on individual profits.” 181 Still, Krupp broke for
Hitler before he came into office, probably sometime after the November 1932 elections. 182 On
February 20, 1933, the senior Krupp, Gustav, attended the previously mentioned meeting with
Hitler and Göring, at the conclusion of which he donated a million reichmarks to the Nazis and
organized the collection of two million more from other industrialists. 183 Thereafter Gustav
Krupp became a leading fundraiser for the Nazi party. 184
In the years following 1933, Krupp worked closely with the Nazi regime and the German
army and navy on rearmament, not only filling orders for its own products, but leveraging its
Id. at 44.
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financial strength to spur rearmament more generally. For instance, in 1934, it participated with
four other large firms (including Siemens) in the creation of the Metallurgische
Forschunggesellschaft, which provided creditworthy signatures permitting the Reichsbank to
discount armament bills. 185 The Krupp firm became an organizational spearhead for the Nazi’s
rearmament project and the Nazification of German industry, for example by requiring all of its
workers to demonstrate allegiance to Hitler by performing the Nazi salute. 186
Krupp also directed its efforts to neutralizing technological development by foreign firms
that might develop technologies important to waging war. In 1941, the United States Justice
Department brought an antitrust case against General Electric and Krupp, alleging that the firms
had colluded in 1938 to monopolize worldwide production and sale of carboloy, a trade name
for tungsten carbide. 187 The case was suspended during the war, and eventually went to trial in
1947, with the Krupp firm under control of the U.S. occupation authorities. 188 Despite the
suspension of the antitrust case, the Senate Patents Committee held hearings in April of 1942,
in which GE was accused of participating in a conspiracy that led to a “drastic shortage” of
carboloy, which was freely available in Germany. Ostensibly settling patent infringement
claims, Krupp and GE had agreed to divide up the world markets for carboloy, with GE getting
the United States and Canada and Krupp the rest of the world. 189 Throughout the trial, the
prosecution presented evidence that the market-division agreement had led to price increases
and losses of American jobs. 190 The trial also underscored the importance of carboloy to the
war effort and the deleterious effects of its limited availability in the United States during the
war: one witness testified that a tool edged with tungsten carbonite could be used 1,000 times
before it had to be reground compared to 100 times for other tools. 191 By contrast, “[w]ithout
[carboloy] the German military machine could not have been built in the time it was built and
in the efficient manner it was built.”192 The district court ultimately found GE liable and
imposed a relatively small corporate fine.
****
These case studies of Farben/Degussa, Siemens/AEG, and Krupp demonstrate both
heterogeneity and commonality when it comes to characterizing the relationship between
German cartels and monopolies and the rise of the Third Reich. The firms had different
corporate structures, attitudes toward competition, and receptivity to Hitler, and they obtained
their market dominance in different ways. None of them instigated Hitler’s rise to power. Yet
the concentrated market power that characterized each of their industries facilitated Hitler’s
ascension to totalitarianism and his wars of aggression and undermined U.S. war readiness. The
section that follows subjects the raw historical facts just discussed to a variety of analytical
questions, such as the degree to which industrial concentration “caused” Hitler, whether the
problem was large corporate scale or market power in an economic sense, and by what
mechanisms industrial concentration may have facilitated Hitler’s rise and consolidation of
power.
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III. CAUSATION, MECHANISMS, AND QUESTIONS OF SCALE AND POWER
A. Four Analytical Questions
The previous section showed that industrial cartels and monopolies played a significant
role in Hitler’s consolidation of power, in Germany’s wars of aggression, and in the evils
perpetrated by the Nazi regime. But it does not necessarily follow that the concentration of
German industry is causally related to the rise of fascism—or that monopoly enabled Nazism.
Four matters should give us pause before making such an inference.
First, we should dispense at the outset with the strongest version of the causation argument:
that industrial concentration is the root cause of Nazism—as some of the previously cited
political rhetoric suggests. In drawing morals from the history of fascism for current antitrust
policy, skeptics frequently note that a large number of complex social, political, economic, and
ideological factors lie at the root of Nazism, 193 and that reducing the story to “monopoly caused
Hitler” is overly simplistic. Of course, these critics are right—industrial concentration was only
one of many factors that contributed to the rise of Third Reich. The burden of this paper is not
to prove any particular version of causation—“but for,” proximate, necessary and sufficient,
substantial, contributing, etc. Rather, it is to show that the high concentration of the German
economy facilitated Hitler’s rise to power, consolidation of power, and wars of aggression. Had
economic power in critical industries been significantly more dispersed, it would have been
considerably more difficult for the Nazis to obtain such an inexorable grip on all aspects of
German society once they came to political power in 1933. Whether or not monopolies and
cartels “caused” Hitler, they facilitated his rise and consolidation of power.
Second, the direction of causation requires further specification. Did preexisting monopoly
conditions in the German industry precipitate the rise of Nazism, or did ascendant Nazism
promote monopoly? In other words, were monopoly and cartelization causes or symptoms of
German fascism? The answer, in short, is that the monopolization and cartelization of the
German economy preceded the Nazis by several decades. Although the Nazis certainly
furthered and deepened the concentration of economic power after 1933, 194 as shown in Part
II(A), the stage was fully set by 1933. For example, Farben’s chemical monopoly did not
come about as a facet of national industrial policy during wartime. Rather, the cartel preceded
World War I by a decade and the merger-to-monopoly preceded the Second World War by
fifteen years.
However, that the Nazis made such a priority of furthering industrial concentration and
consolidation as a key facet of their economic, political, social, and military policy also speaks
to the relevance of the pre-Nazi monopolization and cartelization of the German economy as a
factor in facilitating the Nazis’ rise to power. According to the Decartelization Unit’s report
Germany’s Major Industrial Combines, “the structural changes that took place after 1933 would
seem to indicate that there was scarcely any economic or political measure, no matter what its
ostensible aim, that did not ultimately result in the increased concentration and centralization
of industrial and political power.” 195 Further, the Nazi party and bureaucracy displayed a strong
preference for dealing with a single business or small handful of businesses per industry,
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consistently directing procurement and patronage to monopoly or dominant firms. 196 Fascist
governments in Italy and Japan also tended to consolidate political power by consolidating and
concentrating industry. 197 The fact that the Nazis pushed concentration and monopolization as
part of their industrial and political strategy suggests that an already-concentrated,
monopolized, and cartelized economy was congenial to the character of the Nazi regime at the
time of its ascension. 198
Third, economic concentration could have facilitated the German war effort without
necessarily facilitating fascism per se. Characteristically of the German businessmen tried at
Nuremberg for war crimes, the I.G. Farben executives vigorously objected that they had acted
only as patriotic businessmen serving their country during wartime, just as their counterparts
did in Allied territory. 199 Though gigantic, Farben remained smaller than three American
industrial concerns—General Motors, U.S. Steel, and Standard Oil. 200 Nor was Farben’s
wartime market power exceptional. During both World Wars, the United States largely
suspended the antitrust laws in war-critical industries in order to mobilize economically and
militarily. 201 During the First World War, the federal government relaxed antitrust enforcement
to permit competitor collaborations and suspended pending antitrust cases against United States
Steel, Eastman Kodak, American Can, and International Harvester. 202 President Wilson opined
that “to vindicate the [antitrust] law, [it] would disorganize industry.” 203 During the Second
World War, the Roosevelt administration issued grants of formal immunization to permit
otherwise anticompetitive activities supporting the war effort, allowed small firms to pool
resources, allowed the Secretaries of War and Navy a veto over antitrust prosecutions, and tolled
over thirty antitrust cases. 204 Even the previously mentioned prosecution of Standard Oil for its
participation in the JASCO debacle was ordered tolled at the instance of the War Department
in order to allow Standard to focus on the war effort, as was the case against General Electric
and Krupp. 205 That the U.S. government viewed some degree of enhanced industrial
concentration and collaboration as critical to the war effort suggests that such relaxation of
competition norms and increases in market power may be endemic to war efforts in general,
whether in the service of liberal democracy or its regrettable alternatives.
Fourth, and perhaps most importantly for present purposes, there is a question of whether
the industrial factor that facilitated the rise of Nazism was “bigness” or market power.
Corporate size is distinct from market power in the sense in which economists and antitrust
196
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lawyers use that term—as the power to raise price above a competitive level and exclude
competitors. 206 A firm of tremendous size may have little market power, and a relatively small
firm may have significant market power. The distinction between market power and corporate
bigness has long been understood, and it has been consequential to antitrust law. In 1952, future
Nobel Laureate George Stigler drew a distinction between two meanings of “bigness” in
business: “First, bigness may be defined in terms of the company's share of the industry in
which it operates . . . . Second, bigness may mean absolute size--the measure of size being
assets, sales, or employments as a rule.” 207 He added that antitrust law deals adequately with
the first phenomenon but “cannot cope effectively with the problem posed by big business.” 208
Even during the era in which Brandeisian views largely prevailed in the Supreme Court, mere
corporate bigness was not sufficient to constitute an antitrust offense. 209 Still, though modern
antitrust law distinguishes between size and power, strands of antitrust ideology have at times
been concerned with sheer scale, as reflected in the Brandeisian concept of “the Curse of
Bigness.” When Berle and Means warned in 1933 that “[t]he rise of the modern corporation
has brought a concentration of economic power which can compete on equal terms with the
modern state,” 210 their supporting data tables largely demonstrated corporate size as represented
by such factors as gross assets, cash positions, and proportions of securities issued. Thus, it is
important to be clear in specifying whether it was the sheer scale of industrial firms, or the
market power they held in a contemporary microeconomic sense, that played the vital role in
facilitating the Third Reich.
The remained of this Part responds to issues three and four—facilitating war vs. facilitating
fascism, and bigness vs. market power—by distilling the mechanisms of facilitation.
B. The Mechanisms by which Industrial Concentration and Cartelization Enabled
Nazism
1. Monopoly Profits and the Faustian Bargain
Historians who debate the extent to which big business support was important to Hitler’s
rise to power often focus on financial donations to the Nazi party. A U.S. Senate report charged
that “Krupp, Thyssen and other powerful figures on the German industrial scene provided the
Nazis with indispensable financial and political support.” 211 On the other hand, many historians
argue that most of the pre-1933 donations from big business were token amounts given on the
same basis as donations to political parties across the spectrum and did little to aid Hitler’s
ascent to power. 212 As previously noted donations from big industry picked up significantly in
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1933 after Hitler became Chancellor and arguably helped to “consolidate Hitler’s rule.” 213
In judging the importance of big industry’s financial donations and other forms of material
support to the Nazis, it is important to bear in mind that Hitler did not achieve the full
consolidation of political power immediately upon his appointment as Chancellor on January
30, 1933. The Nazis controlled only three out of eleven Cabinet posts and continued to require
the legislative support of the Center Party and the Conservatives for the passage of the Enabling
Act of March 23, 1933, which granted the Reich cabinet “temporary” ruling powers for an
ostensible period of four years. 214 Even after the abolition of political parties other than the
Nazis on July 14, 1933 and the Reichstag’s effective abdication, Hindenburg, as President,
remained commander-in-chief of the military and held the power to negotiate foreign treaties
until his death in August of 1934. It was not until soldiers were required to swear an oath of
allegiance to Hitler on August 20, 1934, over a year and half after his ascension as Chancellor,
that Hitler achieved full dictatorial power over Germany. 215 Hitler’s plenary control over
industry arguably preceded his plenary control over the army.
Moreover, as Hallgarten observes, the significance of big industry’s financial contributions
to the Nazis in the critical years of his ascension lies in much more than the immediate impact
on filling the party’s coffers:
While Hitler was strongly assisted by the industrialist’s funds, one cannot say that
industry “made” his movement. A movement of such enormous size as his which
in 1932 controlled 230 seats in the Reichstag, is not made by any individual or
group. It might be more correct to state that heavy industry by its very existence
and social nature caused the movement, or, at least, helped to cause it and once it
was given birth tried to use it for the industrialists’ purposes. Mechanization and
economic concentration, maintenance of monopoly prices and monopoly
agreements, with the resulting pressure on small competitors, were the fertile
ground on which mass fascism grew. 216
The significance of financial contributions by the monopolists and cartelists from 1933 forward
cannot be measured solely in terms of enabling the Nazi party’s financial activities. More
importantly, the donations evidence big industry’s willingness to strike a Faustian bargain with
the Nazi regime, in which the captains of industry would support the regime not only with their
pocketbooks but also through a variety of other organizational, political, and economic
mechanisms in exchange for the party’s favor and furtherance of their market dominance
through the regime’s industrial policy. That big industry may have come into the Nazi fold
grudgingly does not negate the fact that, when the political winds turned and Hitler’s long-term
political dominance seemed likely, the concentrated structure of German industry produced the
Faustian bargain—the exchange of continued monopoly rents for the support of a political
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regime that big industry was not otherwise inclined to favor.
The case of German fascism may be a vivid illustration of what economist Luigi Zingales
has called a “Medici vicious circle,” (based on a case study of the Medici dynasty in medieval
Florence) in which money [derived from monopoly profits] is used to gain political power and
political power is then used to make more money.” 217 Zingales argues that monopolists have a
unique ability to capture politics over the long term based on (1) their ability to make credible
long-term promises, (2) their grip on the market for specific human capital, (3) their ability to
wrap their self-interest in “a bigger, noble idea,” and (4) the social control they acquire through
their image in society as it affects employment, data ownership, media ownership, advertising,
research funding, and other methods. 218 In 1933, German heavy industry had already
accumulated significant economic and political power through consolidation and cartelization.
Hitler’s rise simultaneously threatened the persistence of the industrialists’ monopoly rents and
created an opportunity to retain and even grow those rents in the future through increased state
patronage and national rearmament. By casting their lot with Hitler in 1933, the monopolies
and cartels were spending some of the income earned from their existing monopoly status to
buy political power in the rising regime. In coming years, the monopolies and cartels would
spend their political capital to earn even greater monopoly rents—an outcome clearly evidenced
by their soaring profits in the later years of the Nazi regime. 219
To understand the significance of monopoly power to this Faustian bargain, it may be
helpful to imagine a counter-factual situation in which the German economy was significantly
less concentrated at the time of Hitler’s ascension to power. Smaller individual firms in
unconcentrated markets might still have been willing to make the Faustian bargain—support
for the regime in exchange for economic privileges—but the bargain would have been much
harder to strike or enforce because the mutual gains would have been significantly more difficult
to assure. A small business firm in an unconcentrated market would not have the financial or
other economic resources to offer the regime in its quest to centralize power. Nor could the
regime as easily promise smaller firms long-run monopoly profits, which would require
suppressing many competitor firms capable of mounting robust political and economic
opposition. As previously noted, Hitler’s initial political support was far deeper among smallscale businesspeople who felt threatened by the power of the cartels and monopolies, 220 but it
was to those cartels and monopolies that Hitler turned to consolidate his power and arm for war.
The exchange of material support from monopolies for the promise of continued and deepened
monopoly power depends on the preexistence of monopoly power and the regime’s ability
credibly to promise its continuation. Those were the circumstances of Germany in 1933.
2. Organizational Structure, Industry-Wide Mobilization, and Dissemination of
Propaganda
Beyond cash payments to finance the Nazis directly, which may nor may not have been
critical to the Nazis in the years of their ascendance, the Faustian bargain manifested itself in
forms of organizational, industrial, and political support that were of immense help to Hitler as
he worked to consolidate power after his ascension as Chancellor. Monopoly business firms
were ideally positioned to facilitate the rapid consolidation of political power by lending the
217
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Nazi party an organizational and bureaucratic structure at a time when the party was not yet in
full control of either the political or military bureaucracy. For instance, once Farben’s senior
managers had made a bet that alliance with Hitler was critical to the firm’s long-run profitability
(particularly given the immense commercial benefits that would come to a chemical monopoly
from a program of rearmament and industrial-military independence), they effectively put the
firm and its resources at Hitler’s disposal—with the understanding, of course, that the firm
would be allowed to cash in financially by serving as a military-economic arm of the state. Thus
developed a co-dependent relationship between the firm and the regime. Over time, the firm
became evermore intermeshed organizationally intermeshed with the Wehrmacht and took on
many of economy-wide planning functions characteristic of governmental bureaucracies. With
fewer internal checks and balances to overcome than in the political and military spheres, a
massive organization that already, by virtue of its monopoly position, controlled large swaths
of the German economy was a prime vehicle for a rising political force eager to centralize
power.
More generally, once the Faustian bargain had been struck, the great industrial monopolies
were well-positioned to begin carrying out the Nazi regime’s economic, political, and social
policies with immediate and far-reaching effect. These policies included such measures as
purging Jews from senior management positions, reorienting industries toward rearmament,
achieving German industrial independence, and spreading Nazi propaganda. Having signed
onto the Nazi regime, the monopolies were able to begin advancing these policies across
hundreds of thousands of employees and entire industries spread throughout Germany.
In many cases, the Nazis allowed the bureaucratic and managerial functions assigned to the
monopolies and cartels during the early days of the regime to continue even after the Nazis had
secured plenary political power. A U.S. War Department study submitted to Congress found
that the Nazi apparatus never achieved an economic organizational superstructure independent
of the dominant business firms assigned to run the major sectors of the German economy and
that the Nazis were economically “helpless” without the bureaucratic structure of the firms
themselves. 221 The Nazis built up their own “army, police, and spy system” but relied heavily
on the centralized power of their corporate partners to administer the regime’s economic
policies. 222 “[T]he bureaucratic structure itself was controlled by an oligarchy consisting of the
chief stockholders of the great combines, the political hierarchy, and the military High
Command.” 223 Often the captains of industry were given official governmental titles so that
they could run economic functions officially from within their own firm structures. The head
of I.G. Farben held the position of National Deputy for Chemicals and the chairman of the
coordinating organization of coal cartels was also given the title National Deputy and ran the
coal industry through the offices of the Ruhr coal syndicate. 224
The role of big industry in propagating Nazi propaganda and coercing allegiance to the
Nazi cause was also important to the regime. Farben played a significant role as an incubator
and disseminator of Nazi propaganda. The firm employed 120,000 people, 225 and owned a
number of newspapers, 226 which allowed the firm to spread Nazi propaganda in Germany and
around the world. 227 Although senior Farben managers continued to have private qualms about
the Nazi regime, the firm sprang into action to ensure ideological purity and adherence to the
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regime among its workforce. On May Day—May 1—1933, Farben lined up its plant workers
to hear Nazi speeches and give “Sig Heil” chants. 228 Similarly, as of August 1933, all workers
in Krupp factories were required to give the Nazi salute; any who refused were terminated. 229
Once the dominant firms had bet on Hitler, they were able to serve as channels of his policies
and ideology with greater alacrity than many other institutions of German society.
3. Cartelization and Political Control
In a September 1944 letter to Secretary of State Cordell Hull, President Roosevelt
observed that German “cartels were utilized by the Nazis as governmental instrumentalities to
achieve political ends.” 230 Thurman Arnold, a Yale law professor and Assistant Attorney
General for the Justice Department’s Antitrust Division, echoed similar themes in his 1943
introduction to a book by two federal officials on Hitler’s use of Germany’s cartels, observing
that “the vast centralized organization of Germany became a tool in the hands of a dictator who
no longer operated for private profit but solely to serve a ruthless ambition.” 231 Although some
of this rhetoric was directed at drumming up domestic opposition to the cartelization of the U.S.
economy rather than providing a sober assessment of Germany, the basic point was correct: The
existence of German cartels greatly facilitated Hitler’s goal of achieving plenary political
control over the German economy and reorienting it for war. 232
As noted in Part IIA, the German economy was subject to an increasing pattern of
cartelization from the Imperial period up through the Weimar period, to the point that, with the
Nazi ascendancy, cartels permeated the German economy. The Nazis quickly turned the
cartelized structure of the German economy to their own ends. A decree of July 15, 1933
amended the 1923 permit decree to centralize power over cancellation of cartel agreements in
the Minister of Economics, which “made possible a more effective integration of state control
over cartels and general economic policy.” 233 A second decree the same day authorized the
Minister of Economics to create compulsory cartels—essentially allowing the Reich
government to force firms to participate in cartels. 234 Little by little, the government employed
these powers to bring industry firmly under state control and transform the cartels into “agents
of a totalitarian government.” 235
The Nazis used the reinforced cartel structure pervading the German economy as means
to achieve total control over every aspect of German industry. A decree of November 12, 1936
integrated the cartels into the state’s administrative hierarchy and charged administrative groups
with regulating the German markets through the means of the cartels. 236 This administrative
structure also served as one of the Nazis’ chief means of orchestrating business surveillance.
The groups were charged with maintaining non-public registers of the cartels’ existence,
composition, area, membership, and duties and reporting any market-regulating activities
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contemplated by the cartels. 237 The Decartelization Unit observed that “[i]n a war economy,
the ability to deal with a few large organizations in possession of detailed information
concerning all of the various aspects of production and distribution is of inestimable
advantage—as the Nazis were quick to realize.” 238 Similarly, writing in 1957, German scholar
Ivo Schwartz summarized the Nazi appropriation of Germany’s highly cartelized economy as
follows: 239
Cartels proved themselves a very appropriate device to increase the power of the
totalitarian system. By law the Reich Minister of Economics was authorized to
establish compulsory cartels in any branch of industry or, by executive decree,
to compel outsiders to join cartels already existing. Compulsory and free cartels
were used to establish and maintain price, raw material and production controls
as introduced by the government. Finally, they were used to strengthen the
government-planned war industry. At the beginning of World War II, German
industry was highly cartelized and concentrated, and completely in the hands of
the Nazi administration.
The Nazis succeeded in centralizing political power over German industry by
appropriating a decades-long tradition of industrial cartelization as the launchpad of a statedirected and state-controlled economy. 240 Although the Nazis possibly could have achieved
economy-wide cartelization on their own initiative from scratch, the existing cartel structure
greatly expedited their campaign to achieve total control over the German economy.
Significantly, this power-consolidating effect arose not so much from corporate “bigness” as
from a culture of business collusion rather than competition. Many of the cartels included
scores of smaller or medium-sized firms. 241 The Nazis effectively used their mutual
interdependence through the medium of anticompetitive agreements as a lever to exert political
control over entire industries.
4. National Champions and the Military-Industrial Complex
As applied to German fascism, the classic version of the “military-industrial complex” of
which President Eisenhower would warn in his valedictory address in 1961, 242 holds that
German industrial monopolies that would profit from rearmament and war propelled Hitler to
power. As previously discussed, this characterization of heavy industry’s support for Hitler
during the Weimar period is doubtful. 243 Still, that big industry was initially reluctant to support
the Fuhrer does not mean that the highly concentrated structure of German industry critical to
rearmament played no role in Hitler’s rise. The previously described Faustian bargain does not
depend on industry having been enthusiastic for Hitler’s rise, but on it having the incentive to
pledge loyalty to a regime whose consolidation of power seemed imminent and that could
promise war profits in exchange for the monopolies’ support. Once convinced that Hitler was
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239
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in power for the long term and that this meant an opportunity to grow monopoly profits, firms
like Farben had the capacity to “creat[e] an infrastructure that would allow it to respond directly
to the government’s demands for strategic autarky—in effect, taking a leading role in getting
Germany ready for war.” 244
Moreover, the monopolies were in a unique position to play the role of “national
champions” neutralizing or pacifying foreign rivals’ efforts at developing products critical for
war. As noted in the earlier case studies, Farben, Siemens, and Krupp were each involved in
market allocation agreements with U.S. firms that the Nazi regime used to impede American
development in war-critical product lines: Farben with Standard Oil as to buna rubber,245
Siemens with Bendix as to automatic pilots and as to beryllium with Beryllium Corp., 246 and
Krupp with General Electric as to carboloy. 247 A 1941 Congressional Research Service report
on foreign control of U.S. patents found numerous other instances in which German firms were
able to limit the availability of defense-related materials in the United States because of market
division agreements under color of patent law with U.S. firms. 248 Although some of the market
division agreements predated the Nazis, the Nazi regime made strategic use of them to prevent
U.S. firms from developing indigenous technologies that could replace German-made products
during wartime. The regime’s capacity to use its national champion firms in this way to
centralize its global political and military power was only possible because Germany had
national champion firms—i.e., firms with a position of domestic dominance tolerated and
encouraged by the regime as instruments of foreign policy.
5. Decline of Democracy within the Firm
A final potential mechanism by which the concentration of economic power facilitated the
concentration of political power in Nazi Germany concerns the decline of democracy within the
firms themselves in parallel with the decline of democracy in the surrounding political sphere.
As firms that once replicated forms of democracy—or at least the dispersion of authority—
internally began to serve the regime’s goals of concentrating political power, it was not long
until power within the firm had to be centralized as well. Once the firms became intermeshed
with the hierarchical and centralized power structure of the state, democracy within the firm
could not long survive. The decline of democracy within the firm, in turn, furthered the
regime’s power-centralizing goals in society generally.
Consider the symbiotic effects of the relationship between I.G. Farben and the Nazi regime
and the resulting loss of checks and balances—of democratic features—within the Farben
organization itself. In 1937-38, as Farben was becoming increasingly an arm of the regime, the
company reorganized to centralize power in a few senior managers: 46 once distinct subsidiaries
were absorbed into the main enterprise, the number of managing and supervising board
members was reduced, the governing powers of the firm’s Central Committee were largely
transferred to the company’s president, company minutes and records ceased to be widely
circulated, and board members were denied access to financial reports. 249 In short, the firm
organizationally replicated many of the democracy-quashing changes occurring in the political
Jeffreys, surpa n. xxx at 206.
Supra n. xxx.
246
Supra n. xxx.
247
Supra n. xxx.
248
Buel W. Patch, Foreign Control of American Patents (July 17, 1941),
https://library.cqpress.com/cqresearcher/document.php?id=cqresrre1941071700; see also Wells, supra n.
xxx at 43-52.
249
Hayes, supra n. xxx at 203-05.
244
245

https://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_current/164
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3436231

36

Crane:

Forthcoming 119 Mich. L. Rev. ___ (2020)
regime, with the effect of extending totalitarian control from the political to the business realm.
Similarly, the Krupp firm also underwent a structural transition under the Nazis in the
direction of increasing centralization of power in the Krupp family. Although the Krupp family
largely controlled the firm, its corporate form allowed for some degree of influence by external
directors. After managerial conflicts arose during the war, Alfried Krupp made a personal
appeal to Hitler for the Krupp firm to be reorganized by state decree, arguing that “the
concentration of responsibility in a single head, especially in critical times . . . cannot be valued
highly enough.” 250 On November 12, 1943, a Fuhrer decree that became known as “Lex Krupp”
specified that “the owner of the Krupp family wealth is empowered to create a family enterprise
with a particular regulation of succession.” 251 The decree resulted in a complete centralization
of corporate power in the Krupp family. 252
The Nazi regime favored centralization of power within its partner monopoly firms, just as
it favored the centralization of power throughout the economy and society more generally. As
the regime worked to centralize its own political power, the concentration of economic power
in a few dominant firms was congenial to its purposes.
****
The beginning of this Section asked whether industrial concentration and cartelization
facilitated Germany’s war effort or the Nazis per se, and whether the problem was really large
scale business or market power in an economic sense. Having distilled the mechanisms by
which the concentrated and cartelized structure of German industry facilitated Hitler, these
questions can now be answered directly, although not necessarily in an unqualified or dogmatic
way.
As to the first question, it is difficult to disentangle Germany’s radical re-armament and
wars of aggression from the Nazi regime, since forcibly destroying the Treaty of Versailles
regime was Hitler’ chief political aim. That said, the historical record reveals that German
monopolies and cartels played an important role in consolidating Hitler’s power and carrying
out his policies even apart from the directly military functions—for example, by incubating and
disseminating Nazi ideology, purging Jewish managers, and centralizing power over industry.
As to the question of large scale versus market power, it is true that some of the democracyeroding effects were products of large organizational structure rather than market power in an
economic sense. Still, the historical record suggests that it was not just the gigantic size of the
Farbens, but the economic dominance of even the much smaller Degussas, that made them such
convenient vehicles for the rise of Nazism. What Hitler needed in 1933 was firms willing to
cut the Faustian bargain with ample cash to bankroll his political regime extra-governmentally,
an organizational structure spread throughout German society, and the economic power to drive
an entire industry at a dictator’s direction. Abnormal financial resources, ubiquitous local
presence, and—in particular—the power to direct an entire industry, are attributes of monopoly
and cartels. In 1933, the German economy possessed all of these in large quantities due to a
course of economic concentration dating back to Bismarck.
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IV. WHAT SORT OF ANTITRUST REGIME WOULD HAVE PREVENTED THE INDUSTRIAL
CONCENTRATION AND CARTELIZATION THAT FACILITATED HITLER’S RISE?
This final section turns from historical analysis to use of history for presentist concerns
(and hence runs the usual risks of distortion and anachronism). What does the history of early
and mid-twentieth century German industrial concentration and fascism mean for contemporary
debates over antitrust policy? Nearly forty years ago, Bob Pitofsky wrote, in his classic article
The Political Content of Antitrust, that it is “bad history, bad policy, and bad law to exclude
certain political values in interpreting the antitrust laws.” Pitofsky argued that pervasive
monopoly threatened democratic values in three ways: “[F]irst, . . . excessive concentration of
economic power will breed antidemocratic political pressures . . [S]econd, . . . individual and
business freedom [can be enhanced] by reducing the range within which private discretion by a
few in the economic sphere controls the welfare of all . . . [Third] if the free-market sector of
the economy is allowed to develop under antitrust rules that are blind to all but economic
concerns, the likely result will be an economy so dominated by a few corporate giants that it
will be impossible for the state not to play a more intrusive role in economic affairs.” 253 Pitofsky
cited the history of Nazi Germany and the influence of the Decartelization program on the
Celler-Kefauver Act in furtherance of his thesis that antitrust policy should not be blind to the
political and democratic value of maintaining a deconcentrated industrial sector. 254
The historical record of German fascism lends credence to the claim that concentrated
economic power fuels concentrated political power, with corrosive effects for democracy. But
does it follow that an antitrust regime explicitly focused on political values is necessary to the
preservation of democracy, or would an antitrust regime focused on economic values such as
preserving allocative efficiency and maximizing consumer welfare serve the same function?
Some data relevant to answering these questions can be gathered by subjecting the German
story to a counterfactual inquiry that imagines the German economy constrained by
contemporary economically oriented antitrust norms. Would the presence of a consumer
welfare oriented antitrust law have prevented the economic dominance of the Farbens, Siemens,
and Krupps and hence the crucial role they played in supporting the rise and evils of Nazism?
Yes, even an economically and consumer welfare oriented antitrust law would have prevented
much of the monopolization and cartelization that characterized the German economy in 1933.
Prior to reconstruction under the Allies, Germany had no antitrust law—at least none that would
be recognizable under contemporary global standards. 255 If it had, the levels of concentration
and cartelization that characterized Germany in 1933 would not have been possible.
Consider Farben’s path to monopoly, which consisted of five steps: (1) domestic
cartelization; (2) domestic merger to monopoly; (3) international market division; (4)
integration with the state; and (5) foreign industrial conquest through economic and military
coercion. The first three steps were accomplished prior to the rise of the Nazi regime, and put
in place the economic and institutional arrangements that Hitler would seize upon in his
navigation to power. The second two steps, mediated by the Nazi regime, consolidated and
expanded Farben’s preexisting power.
The first three steps present relatively straightforward cases for condemnation under
economically oriented antitrust norms. Naked cartel agreements, including the two 1904
pooling arrangements, the 1916 mega-pool, and the 1926 explosives agreement, are considered
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per se illegal under contemporary antitrust doctrine. 256 The Justice Department vigorously
prosecutes them criminally, yielding billions of dollars in fines and hundreds of years in prison
terms. 257 If contemporary antitrust norms had applied to early twentieth century Germany, the
chemical cartel could not lawfully have occurred. By the same token, the vast swath of naked
cartel arrangements that permeated German industry would have been unlawful.
Similarly, the 1925 merger to monopoly that created Farben would almost certainly have
been disallowed under consumer welfare oriented antitrust norms. Although mergers, unlike
cartels, are judged under a rule of reason standard rather than a per se rule of illegality, a merger
between the nine largest chemical companies in the country, resulting in a HerfindahlHirschman Index figure of a perfect 10,000 in many sectors, would almost certainly be
prohibited. 258
Farben’s international market division agreement with Standard Oil presents a somewhat
closer case than the domestic cartel agreements and merger to monopoly. Though it involved
market division, JASCO nominally advanced two interests recognized as generally
procompetitive under contemporary antitrust norms: (1) licensing contested patent rights; and
(2) pooling economic and technical resources for joint research and development activities.259
Despite these facially procompetitive effects, the JASCO arrangement would likely fail under
contemporary antitrust norms—as it did when challenged by the Justice Department in 1942.
The sweeping global market division accomplished by the JASCO agreements—allocating
entire product segments and the entire globe—quite plainly exceeded the scope of any relevant
patent rights, and hence would be considered per se illegal market division under prevailing
contemporary norms. 260 Moreover, the “joint research” functions of JASCO apparently did not
involve much genuine pooling of technical resources by the two companies, as evidenced by
the fact that Standard’s scientists and engineers were unable to replicate the production of buna
without Farben’s help until, after the termination of the agreement, they effectively reinvented
the wheel. 261 The “joint study” arrangement seems to have operated principally as an allocation
of buna research and market exploitation to Farben, with a loose expectation that Farben might
later enable Standard to enter the field as well. 262 Such an arrangement would also be
considered unlawful market division under contemporary antitrust norms, as it was in 1942.263
By the same token, Siemens and Krupp’s market division agreements with American firms
under color of patent law were challenged in American court under American antitrust
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principles. 264
The last two steps—integration with the state and foreign conquest—permitted Farben to
consolidate and enlarge its preexisting monopoly power under the Third Reich. Contemporary
antitrust norms would not likely have been availing to curb these abuses, but not due to
antitrust’s contemporary economic or consumer welfare orientation. Direct state involvement
in the creation of monopoly power generally renders the scheme untouchable under the antitrust
laws not out of solicitude to consumer welfare or efficiency but because of political
commitments to federalism and democratic processes. 265 Indeed, it has largely been advocates
of the consumer welfare approach that have argued for narrowing state action immunity on the
view that states systematically distort competitive processes for the benefit of rent-seekers. 266
As to economic conquests during the war, this facet of Farben’s malfeasance is quite obviously
beyond the possible scope of any domestic antitrust law. This is not to say that it is untouchable
by law more generally. Nine of the Farben defendants were convicted at Nuremberg on the
charges of plundering and spoliation of public and private property, and expropriation of
property during war remains a serious crime under the Hague Convention. 267
In sum, application of contemporary economically oriented antitrust principles could have
prevented Farben’s rise to dominance in Germany, and hence the exploitation of Farben’s
monopoly to facilitate Hitler’s rise to power. Once the firm and state were organizationally
intermeshed and part of a single, lawless program of domestic and international conquest and
control, no form of antitrust law—nor any other domestic law—realistically could have arrested
their brutal trajectory.
Although the vast bulk of the monopolistic and cartelizing conduct that facilitated Hitler’s
rise and consolidation of power would have been illegal under the consumer welfare standard,
contemporary antitrust norms would not have prevented all vestiges of market power in the
Weimar economy, any more than they eliminate all vestiges in the American economy today.
Some of the dominance of the large industrial firms in question came about through legitimate
means, such as managerial skill or technological innovation—the “superior skill, foresight, and
industry” that Learned Hand famously held off limits to antitrust scrutiny in Alcoa, another
wartime antitrust case. 268 And some of the conduct that spurred the big firms to dominance by
impairing smaller rivals might today be found to enhance efficiency, and hence not constitute
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an antitrust violation. Still, the core elements that drove German industry to its concentrated
stage in the late Weimar period—cartelization and merger to monopoly—are paradigmatic
instances of conduct prohibited by contemporary antitrust principles. It is therefore fair to say
that application of consumer welfare oriented antitrust principles would have prevented the path
that the German economy took to concentration and monopoly in 1933 and beyond.
CONCLUSION
Concerns that industrial monopoly and cartelization undermines democracy are not new.
Most recently in Western history, such concerns obtained political traction in the wake of the
Second World War, to the point that anti-fascism served as a dominant motivation underling
the post-War antitrust regimes in both the United States and Europe. With the ascendancy of
calls for a reinvigorated antitrust regime in service of democracy today, it is important to recall
the similar conversation that took place in light of fascism’s existential threat to the democratic
order. The framers of the post-War antitrust regimes in the Europe and the United States were
convinced that a strong anti-monopoly and anti-cartelization norm was necessary to preventing
the reemergence of the sort of consolidated economic power that empowered fascism and
threatened democratic liberalism. This Article has presented historical evidence substantiating
that concern—demonstrating that industrial concentration and cartelization in Weimar
Germany facilitated Hitler’s rise and consolidation of political power.
What contemporary uses should be made of this history? On a scholarly basis, much work
remains to be done to establish the general proposition that extreme concentration of economic
power tends to facilitate extreme concentrations of political power. The Nazi story, while
obviously significant because of Germany’s leading role in mid-twentieth-century fascism, is
only one piece in the wider story of fascism. Similar inquiries into periods of fascist or quasifascist regimes in other nations, including Japan, Italy, Spain, and Portugal, could allow for a
more general conclusion about the importance of industrial concentration and cartelization in
the rise of fascism. And then there are important questions about the relationship between
economic concentration and other forms of totalitarian or highly centralized political power,
such as the Stalinist systems about which the framers of the Celler-Kefauver Act worried as the
next frontier of monopoly. The idea that concentrated economic power breeds concentrated
political power has much rhetorical appeal, but documenting the relationship historically,
exploring the variations and mechanisms, and prescribing the particular antidotes remains a
largely incomplete project.
Finally, how should the history of economic concentration in Weimar and Nazi Germany
inform current debates over the goals of antitrust law and the direction of antitrust enforcement?
This Article has suggested that the chief culprits in the creation of the overly concentrated
German economy—cartelization and merger to monopoly—are already prohibited by
antitrust’s reigning consumer welfare standard. However, those who believe that the U.S.
economy is becoming dangerously overly concentrated because the consumer welfare standard
has been laxly applied will worry, with Professor Wu, that conditions that facilitated Hitler’s
rise are being replicated in our economy today. 269 Although I am skeptical that this is the case,
that issue is beyond this Article’s purview. Rediscovering the voluminous record of
concentration and cartelization that facilitated the Nazi regime and diagnosing the mechanisms
by which extremely concentrated economic power served to concentrate political power in Nazi
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Germany lays a foundation for the important policy debates to come about the relationship
between democracy and monopoly.
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